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Abstract
This thesis is a part of the Supply Chain 2020 research project which seeks to study best
practices in supply chain management in multiple industries in order to develop a deeper
understanding of key principles and practices characterizing the creation of excellent supply
chains through a long-term research agenda. This thesis addresses the first phase of the research
by concentrating on the aerospace industry and by focusing on Rolls-Royce through a case study.
The objective of the thesis is to conduct an exploratory study of the best practices in supply chain
management in the aircraft engine manufacturing industry, and how these practices impact the
competitive positioning of an engine manufacturer within the industry. The analysis involves a
broad review of the current state and future directions of the aerospace industry by tracing the
key factors shaping its evolution and by identifying the major strategic forces that would
influence its future. Within this general industry context, the thesis analyzes Rolls-Royce's
position in the industry as a leading aircraft engine manufacturer and presents a focused study of
Rolls-Royce's supply chain management practices..
In particular, the thesis involves a deeper exploration of the aircraft engine manufacturing
business segment of Rolls-Royce and strives to understand the company's supply chain
management practices, by examining the role of major factors that have proven crucial to
effective supply chain management within the company. The thesis also presents more specific
case study examples that track the implementation and results of major supply chain
management initiatives. Finally, the supply chain design and management practices are analyzed
from the perspective of their role in the company's business strategy. This is accomplished by
employing a number of business strategy frameworks to understand the key factors that
determine the competitiveness of a tier one supplier in the aerospace industry, such as Rolls-
Royce, and by examining how those factors have affected Rolls-Royce's supply chain
management strategies and practices.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Kirkor Bozdogan
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This chapter describes the purpose and approach of this thesis within the larger context of
the objectives of the Supply Chain 2020 (SC2020) research project. It also gives a background
description of salient characteristics of the aerospace industry and indicates why it is an
interesting industry to study in identifying emerging best practices in supply chain management.
Finally, it introduces Rolls-Royce, an important manufacturer of engines in the aerospace
industry, which is the subject of a case study to provide a more fine-grained examination of key
trends in supply chain management in the aerospace industry.
The following chapters provide a review of the existing literature on the aerospace
industry (Chapter 2) and the current state of the industry (Chapter 3). This is followed by an
overview of Rolls-Royce as a case-study of a tier-one supplier in the aerospace industry, given in
Chapter 4. Specifically, Rolls-Royce's aircraft engine manufacturing business and its specific
supply chain practices are studied in Chapter 5. Finally, the supply chain's role in its business
strategy is analyzed in Chapter 6, to understand how it supports its business and operational
objectives and enables it to survive and gain market share in the competitive environment of a
consolidating industry.
1.1 The Supply Chain 2020 Research Project
The Supply Chain 2020 (SC 2020) research project is designed to study supply chains in
the aerospace, apparel, automotive, computers manufacturing, communication equipment,
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consumer packaged goods, pharmaceutical, petroleum and retail industries. This would be done
by studying leading companies within these industries, to ascertain what specific supply chain
practices are being followed by these companies that make them a leader.
Two question that arise as one thinks about the project are:
* How does one identify which supply chains are excellent?
" How does one ensure what specific part of all supply chain activity is the one of interest,
and hence worthy of research?
In the context of SC 2020 project, the companies' recent financial and market success is
taken as an indicator of the success of their operational activities. Hence we study the firms
which have demonstrated strength in recent financial performance and have been gaining market
shares in their respective industries. To answer the second question, we study those activities
which are considered by the industry practitioners as creating strategic value, and which they
plan to focus on over the long term horizon.
Rolls-Royce is an attractive candidate for research, since it has moved with the industry
dynamics since 1980's and has maneuvered itself into a position of strength in late 1990's in a
fast maturing and consolidating industry. It has done so primarily by focusing on its suppliers
and creating a competitive supply chain which can be a source of learning for other industries
and companies. We intend to understand these lessons learned in the SC 2020 research project.
1.1.1 Motivation for the SC 2020 Research Project
The long-term goal of the SC 2020 project is to identify "excellent" supply chain practices in
specific industries, and study any patterns or similarities that can be identified. The results of this
study can be then applied to different industries, and one can evaluate the applicability and
12
benefits of successful practices of one industry to another. Together with conceptual knowledge
and understanding of patterns in such supply chains, a projection can be made as to how a
company's supply chain should look in the year 2020 (within the context of a its specific
industry), so as to become a leader, or maintain existing leadership position. Hence the SC 2020
research motivation is as follows:
SC 2020 Research Motivation': The Supply Chain 2020 Project intends to identify and analyze
the factors that are critical to the success of future supply chains out to the year 2020.
1.1.2 Phase 1 of the SC 2020 Project:
The SC 2020 project is divided into three phases 2
1) Current phase: Understanding the current supply chains in the industries under study.
2) Modeling phase: Using this understanding to develop macro-factor scenarios and create a
supply chain model.
3) Analysis phase: Finalize the supply chain scenarios and analyze the likely impact of
supply chain design in 2020, and the implications for corporate action today.
In the current phase of the project, the project focuses on researching today's excellent
supply chains to identify what is important in maintaining a competitive positioning. This
includes the business strategies, operating models, goals, and supply chain processes that yield
the best results for a company in its industry.
This thesis seeks to study the aerospace industry's supply chain by studying one of the
leading companies in the industry i.e. Rolls-Royce. We try to understand its current position in
'"Proceedings of the Supply Chain 2020 Project's Industry Advisory Council Kickoff Meeting, May 24, 2004"
2 Ibid
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the industry and the practices that make Rolls-Royce's supply chain a competitive one. The
formal research question for the thesis is described below.
1.1.3 Thesis Research Question
The basic research question being addressed in this thesis can be defined as follows: What
are the emerging best practices in supply chain management in the aerospace industry and what
business strategies, operating models, goals, and processes makes the supply chain management
practices of a particular case-study company's supply chain management practices exemplary?
While the thesis strives to identify such emerging best practices, it does not take the position that
they are necessarily widely prevalent within the industry. Further, the thesis does not necessarily
endorse or intend to portray the supply chain management practices of a specific case-study
company (e,g. Rolls-Royce) as necessarily being "exemplary" or "best-in-class" but rather as an
illustrative example of currently observed practices.
1.1.4 Thesis Roadmap
This thesis includes two studies:
1) Looking at the industry and the sub-industry of aircraft engine manufacturing. The focus
would be on the broad industry-wide trends, patterns and emerging practices in supply chain
management within the aerospace industry, specifically the engine manufacturers. The purpose
would be to identify emerging examples of supply chain excellence within engine
manufacturing, and therefore study the factors shaping these developments. The factors affecting
the industry are:
* Market demand shifts, customer preferences.
" Shifts in military acquisition policies.
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" New technological developments.
" Affect of geo-politics on what products are needed/ demanded.
2) A case study of Rolls-Royce, to focus on the supply chain management practices in its aircraft
engines manufacturing businesses. The purpose would be to study what factors were changed in






* Affect on profitability and position in the industry.
This study would bring out the factors that matter most to maintain a strong position in the
industry, and hence the 'excellence' of these parameters can be studied.
1.2 Methodology
The research on the question is accomplished through the following steps:
* Literature review and conceptual understanding: Extensive review of the MIT's Lean
Aerospace Initiative's library of research on aerospace manufacturing and supply chain
management practices to study overall industry and its dynamics. Further external
literature such as industry reports from consulting and financial companies, credit rating
agencies and research institutions would be studied. Other important resources used
include consultants working with the industry and views of the industry experts on the
15
aerospace industry. This study would yield an understanding of what issues are relevant
to supply chains within the aerospace industry.
" Study of company documents: On specific companies, including the case study
company, study of existing internal or publicly available documents relevant to their
supply chain systems and management processes.
" Company visits and Interviews: On-site visits to the case study company and interviews
with company personnel, in order to gain an organizational and a conceptual view of its
existing supplier network and supply chain management practices and processes from the
company's perspective.
* Results of the study presented using the company as a case study: Finally, an analysis
of the information developed would be integrated for an overall characterization and
evaluation of Rolls-Royce's supplier network, supply chain management practices and
processes.
1.3 Evolution of the aerospace industry:
The aerospace industry has been changing significantly over the past 20-30 years to shift
attention to the cost structure of the aircraft. Specifically, an engine manufacturer such as Rolls-
Royce has also changed tremendously over last decade to focus heavily on supply chain and
supplier relationships and cultivate it as a strength to reduce costs while increasing functionality,
and hence create a source of competitive advantage.
The aerospace industry is unique because of the high interdependence and close linkages
between the manufacturers and suppliers. This relationship forms a key part of how the industry
has changed in the past 30 years to focus on cost reduction through better supply chain
16
management. The study of the industry thus offers avenues of analysis and learning to the SC
2020 research project. There have been two distinct phases within the aerospace industry that
have seen significant changes in industry dynamics. These phases were:
1) Airline deregulation (1979): The airline deregulation broke the relationship that Boeing had
with several airlines. Prior to the deregulation, a small number of major domestic airlines had
closely linked, mutually beneficial relationships with the aircraft manufacturers in launching new
products, and were able to play competing producers against each other. Deregulation made it
difficult for airlines to become launch customers, which allowed entry of companies like GE to
enter the market as an entity which had till then not existed in the commercial aerospace industry
i.e. the leasing company. The primary impact of this occurrence was that from 1979 onwards,
affordability of acquiring and operating an airplane became the key in the industry, and
functionality and technology which had been the driving force in the past, took a back seat.
Therefore, the focus shifted from making the most technologically and functionally advanced
aircraft, to decreasing the costs, increasing quality and consistency of performance for the
aircraft and all its components.
2) End of Cold War (1990): The end of the cold war affected the aerospace further. During
much of post World War period, domestic aircraft producers could wage price wars with each
other on the commercial side, with the knowledge that they could expect steady source of profits
from the defense and government procurement. During the post-cold war period, defense budgets
shrank and military aircrafts changed significantly, and as was in case of commercial aerospace,
the focus shifted from innovation to aJjbrdabilitv of the aircraft. The militaries of the North
American and European nations (which are the largest consumers of military aircrafts) sought to
3 K.Bozdogan, Aerospace Industry: an Industry ofIndustries, Working Paper, Lean Aerospace Initiative, Center for
Technology, Policy and Industrial Development, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, November 2000
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have advanced yet affordable aircraft. Hence the focus of the defense aerospace industry became
not only to make a better aircraft, but more importantly, how to do it cheaper.
Both of these developments shifted the attention from technology and functionality, to cost
structure of the aircraft, its engine, avionics and sub-components. In other words, from "Higher,
faster, Further" to "Better, Faster, Cheaper" . The primary driver of this initiative was
collaboration between the suppliers and manufacturers in components design and manufacturing.
Further, the industry started focusing heavily on Lean Manufacturing principles to continuously
drive the costs lower.
1.3.1 Comparison with the Automotive Industry
The industry sought to learn these practices from the automobile industry, which is also a
high capital industry with a large supplier base and had been under pressures to improve costs
and quality due to pressure from the Japanese manufacturers. However, there are crucial
differences with the automotive industry:
Product complexity: While an automobile has 10,000 unique parts, an aircraft may feature over
a million unique parts5 . A car might have a 200 hp engine, while a Boeing 747 has a 75,000 hp
engine.
Role of government regulation: Aerospace is a highly regulated industry, and hence the
methods available to reduce costs would be limited by security and reliability concerns.
4 Earil M. Murman, et al. Lean Enterprise Value: Insights from MIT's Lean Aerospace Initiative (Great Britain,
Houndmills: Palgrave, 2002)
5 K.Bozdogan, Aerospace Industry: an Industry ofIndustries, Working Paper, Lean Aerospace Initiative, Center for
Technology, Policy and Industrial Development, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, November 2000
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Product lifecycle: An average automobile may be used for an average for 10 years, while an
average aircraft could last up to 50 years. Hence, the role of aftermarket service is far more
prominent in the aerospace industry, than the automotive industry.
Production Volumes: While a car is produced in several hundred thousands units, an airplane is
produced in a few thousand units. Therefore, automakers get a sharper edge on implementing
improvements.
But regardless, aerospace can use the automotive or the electronics industry to benchmark itself
on key parameters such as Inventory turns (Figure 1)6, where it lags these industries.
Figure 1: Comparisons of inventory turns in different industries
j )2
ctN vc 4U4 (
from~~~ Lea Entrpis Inttue "20 State ofLaRpr
FuA.t.ere ape co ascexdutrna, "The hiftipRoled f t Supier"ndsie (Tarey' kblianowled
journal), 2003.
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resulting issues are also the same i.e. supply chain integration to work more closely with
suppliers, and lean manufacturing.
1.3.2 Changes in Industry Dynamics since 1979
The following changes characterize the shifts in industry dynamics since 19798:
Supplier relationships. There has been an increased focus on supplier relationships between
manufacturers such as Boeing and Airbus, and their suppliers. Attempts have been made to
change from a 'hierarchical and pyramidical' structure to a 'network' structures which encourage
greater collaboration. This allows closer relationships between the manufacturers and suppliers,
for product development and cost reduction exercises.
Reduction in supplier base: There has been a consolidation in manufacturers and suppliers in the
three sectors of aerospace (i.e., military, commercial and small aircraft). The supplier base in the
industry has been reduced by 50% during the first half of the 1990s due to component
rationalization as well as industry consolidation9 . Therefore, suppliers now supply complete sub-
assemblies, rather than individual components.
Role of government certification: The role of Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) has grown in
importance for the purpose of supplier certification. A certified supplier can supply a component
that need not be tested for use in an aircraft, while a non-certified supplier's component needs
extensive testing.
Increase in technology transfer between the military and commercial aircraft: Since
development costs of a new aircraft are high, most companies leverage designs created for
S K.Bozdogan, Aerospace Industry: an Industry of'Industries, Working Paper, Lean Aerospace Initiative, Center for
Technology, Policy and Industrial Development, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, November 2000
9 Interview with Ian Couldray, Director of Supply Chain at Rolls Royce at Mt. Vernon, OH, December 2004
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government programs (with R&D funded by the government) to create platforms for commercial
products.
Systems view of the industry: The focus in the industry has changed to look at an aircraft as a
system, rather than a collection of individual components. Hence the focus is now on how to
make different components of an aircraft work together, and understand the affect of one
component of performance on another seemingly unrelated component. The system view of the
aircraft includes not only aerospace components, but also the affect of various components and
technologies from related industries such as Telecommunication and Transportation (both
Passenger transportation and Cargo transportation).
Therefore, the aerospace industry provides an interesting environment to study how the
supply chain practices of the industry have reacted to counter the market dynamics and pressures
to maintain margins, and how supply chain management has been used to maintain competitive
positions of the players within the industry. To begin with, it would be important to understand
what is already known about the affect of supply chains of business strategy, and what is already
known about supply chains in the aerospace industry. This would be studied in the next chapter




The forces and the resulting dynamics of the aerospace industry during the 1980's and early
1990's forced the industry to look for solutions to its problems, by turning to academia and
learning from other industries. In that regards, the academic focus on industry's supply chain and
operations is relatively new, compared to other industries such as Retailing or Automotive.
Therefore, the industry is 10-15 years behind the Automotive industry in terms of acquiring new
10
operational methodologies such as supplier collaboration and lean manufacturing principles'.
The research available on aerospace industry's practices, therefore, is fairly recent compared to
research on the automotive industry.
The research on role of operations and supply chains on business strategy, however, is a well
researched topic. The idea of supply chain as being a core part of strategy was discussed by
Porter (1985) where he suggested that competitive advantage depends on not only the firm's
value chain but also how it fits in its overall value system. Porter (1996) proposed that pure
operational excellence is not a strategy. He defined sustainable advantage as one coming from
doing activities that are different from competition, or doing them in a way that is hard to
replicate, and ensuring that these activities are designed to support a specific business that the
firm has chosen to compete in. A firm should choose what business it would compete in, and
therefore also choose what businesses it would not compete in, and then design its activities in a
way (as mentioned above) so that its unique set and design of activities gives it a sustainable
10 Interview with John Weiss, VP, i2 Technologies, March 2004
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advantage. On similar lines, Hammer (2004) proposed that a firm can build sustainable
competitive advantage by excelling at operational activities, and doing them better than
competition. Thus Porter focuses on choosing the right business and then designing a set of
activities that is hard to copy (proposing that competitive value of individual activities cannot be
separated from the whole), while Hammer focuses on performing these activities better than
competition, to get a sustained advantage.
The competition among the aerospace industry players would be analyzed in this perspective
in Chapter 6, evaluating the costs and non-cost factors that are required for maintaining
competitiveness in the industry.
On the subject of designing a set of activities to support a business strategy or an operational
objective, Fisher (1997) proposed that the design of the supply chain (and the activities therein)
should follow from the nature of customer demand for a company's products. Therefore, if the
company has functional products with consistent demand (for example Wal-Mart in the grocery
business), then the company should focus on serving the customers with an efficient supply
chain to get most margins out of the business. On the other hand, if the products are innovative
and have shorter lifecycle with unpredictable demand (for example Hewlett-Packard in laser
printer business), then the company should focus on a responsive supply chain. On similar lines,
Simchi-Levi (2000) explained the use of 'pull', 'push' and push-pull' strategies and that the
correct choice of strategy follows from the nature of product and customer demand. This model
is used in this thesis to analyze and understand the prevalence of a pull based production system
in the highly cyclical aerospace industry.
The research on aerospace industry, due to reasons mentioned in the beginning of the
chapter, is limited. The foremost body of knowledge about the industry comes from the Lean
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Aerospace Initiative (LAI) at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). The subject of lean
manufacturing was introduced to a wide audience by Womack et al. (1990) and Womack et al
(1996) at MIT after their study of the Toyota Production System. However, the principles that
are applicable to the Automotive industry are very relevant for the aerospace industry due to
similarities discussed in Chapter 1. The principles of lean manufacturing emphasize the process
of reducing waste, with the goal of creating value for the organization. Murman et al. (2002) at
LAI have researched the issues facing this 'flagship' industry of the US and many other nations,
and have suggested methods and processes specifically to guide companies in the aerospace
industry in their journey towards developing lean enterprises. The book dives deeply into
different segments of the aerospace industry (i.e., commercial, defense and regional/ corporate
jet market) and traces the evolution of the aerospace industry to understand the forces at play in
the industry, as well as changes in the global geopolitical environment and government
regulations to understand the industry's evolution and current state in a historical perspective. By
presenting a comprehensive analysis of the industry, its operations and supply chain, the LAI has
greatly influenced the recent attempts by the industry in past 8-10 years to adopt principles such
as supplier collaboration and lean manufacturing.
LAI has demonstrated the applicability of lean principles to the aerospace industry through
multiple success stories of aircraft programs such as C-130J transport aircraft, F/A-22 Raptor
fighter aircraft and RAH-66 helicopter, and many other examples.
The LAI research has been reinforced by theses written at MIT. Gostic (1998) used Allied
Signal, Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney as case studies to study supply chain
management in the aerospace industry, and Goh (2003) studies the Maintenance, Repair and
Overhaul (MRO) activities in the industry. These theses are similar in their quest for
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understanding this industry (Gostic, 1998) and the profitable MRO services (Goh, 2003). This
thesis builds on these perspectives and studies Rolls-Royce as a case study in today's perspective
of the aerospace industry.
The understanding of current state of the aerospace industry and the operational and supply
chain practices comes from various industry experts, white-papers written by consultants
advising the industry, and reports from trade bodies such as the Aerospace Industries Association
(AIA) and the US International Trade Commission, which measures the competitiveness of the
various segments of the industry (aircrafts, engines and equipment) in different geographies. The
current and future trends in the industry are documented by journals, for example 'Aviation Week
& Space Technology' and 'Insight', as well as by other magazines, such as 'The Economist' and
'The Engineer'. Further, investment-oriented analysis is presented by financial institutions and
credit rating agencies such as Standard and Poor's. These analyses and trends are used to
understand the industry and the position of Rolls-Royce within the industry.
Finally, the supply chain at Rolls-Royce has been studied in Rolls-Royce's internal
improvement initiatives, and one of its success stories has been documented in a video film
"Supplier Operating Model and AE 3007 Engine Flowline. " This film is a good source of seeing
some of the Rolls-Royce's supply chain principles in practice, and has been used in this thesis to




3 The Aerospace Industry
This chapter defines the global aerospace industry by its components, and provides its
historical revenues, employee strength and profitability. It also covers the primary aerospace
products and customers, the underlying trends and industry drivers and the supply chain structure
within the industry. It then examines the Engines sector of the industry (which is the focus of this
paper), and introduces the primary products and companies within the sector, and traces the
historical and future growth of this sector.
3.1 Definition of the Industry
The aerospace and defense industry has three main sectors. These are "systems &
aerostructures", "engines" and "equipment". The industry also has three product segments
which are "aircraft", "missiles" and "space"."
3.2 The Global Aerospace Industry
The U.S. aerospace industry is the global leader in both revenues and employment. In
2002, total consolidated revenues were in excess of $153 billion and 714,000 employees.' 2 The
European aerospace industry was second largest with 74.6 billion Euros in consolidated revenues
and 408,000 employees.' 3
" The European Association of Aerospace Industries (AECMA) Fact and Figures Report 2002 p.10
12 Aviation Industry Association Revenues and Employment Summary 1988-2002
13 The European Association of Aerospace Industries (AECMA) Fact and Figures Report 2002
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Though many other nations manufacture final products such as jet aircraft and rockets,
none have large commercial aircraft products, defined as passenger transport aircraft with
capacity of one hundred passengers or more (for the purpose of this paper). The aircraft final
product segment made up 52.2% and 46% of revenues in the U.S. and Europe, respectively.' 4
Within the aircraft segment, large commercial aircraft revenues were 54.4% of the European
revenues versus 34.4% of the U.S. revenues. In the same year, the military aircraft segment sales
in the U.S. were the strongest component with $37.9 billion or 47.4% of total revenues. "
Approximately 45% of all defense spending around the world is related to aerospace
systems 6 . Consolidated revenues of primary companies in the defense market, as represented in
Figure 21, shows a trend of growth.
Figure 2: Consolidated revenues of primary aerospace companies by year
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14 The European Association of Aerospace Industries (AECMA) Fact and Figures Report 2002, Aviation Industry
Association Revenues and Employment Summary 1988-2002.
15 Aviation Industry Association 1988-2002
16 JP Morgan Aerospace and Defense report, September 2004
17 From JP Morgan Aerospace and Defense report, September 2004, compiled from Company Reports and JP
Morgan estimates.
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3.2.1 Changes in the Industry through 1990's
At the end of the 1980s the military component of the aircraft segment was nearly double
the commercial segment in terms of revenues. The following five years saw the civil segment
grow in consecutive years to reach the revenue level of the military segment by 1992. The
revenue trend for the U.S. civil aircraft segment has been a steadily positive one since the mid
1990s. The military segment saw very modest growth relative to the commercial segment in the
same period. Both segments reduced their employee base drastically, as can be seen in Table 1.
Table I - Composition of aerospace industry 1989 and 1999- Increase in Civil Aerospace
relative to Defense, and decrease in employee base'8 (All dollar figures are given in millions
of current dollars)
NAICS Code 9  Industry Group 1989 1999
Value of Employment Value of Employment
Shipment (in Shipment (in
s thousands) s thousands)
336411 Aircraft mfg. 43,338.9 277.5 73,961.0 200.2
(SIC 3721)
336412 Aircraft engine & 21,565.8 132.0 24,290.6 83.2
(SIC 3724) engine parts mfg.
336413 Other aircraft & 19,074.9 192.9 22,429.5 132.6
(SIC 3728) auxiliary equipment
mfg.
336411, 336412, Aircraft and 83,979.6 602.4 120,681.1 416.0
336413 parts (Subtotal)
(SIC 372)
336414, 336415, Guided missiles, 29,497.7 221.0 18,981.4 73.9
336419 space vehicles &
(SIC 376) parts (Subtotal)
3364 AEROSPACE 113,477.3 823.4 139,662.4 489.9
(SIC 372, 376) PRODUCTS &
PARTS MFG. -
TOTAL
1 SOURCES: From documents from the LAI repository, compiled by U.S. Department of Commerce, Census
Bureau, 1992 Census of Manufactures, MC92-I-37B(P), Issued December 1994, Table 1
19 The aerospace industry is defined by the U.S. Census Bureau by using the North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS) Code 3364 industry group. Before the 1997 Census of Manufactures, the aerospace industry was
defined by the Census Bureau by using the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system, consisting of two major
industry sectors: SIC 372 (Aircraft and parts) and SIC 376 (Guided missiles, space vehicles and parts).
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The effects of global economic weakness along with the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001 were manifested by a $9 billion, or 18%, drop in revenues from 2001 to 2002 (as shown
in Figure 320 for global Revenue Passenger KM, RPK). This affected airlines, aircraft
manufacturers and engine manufacturers. For example, after September 11, 2001, the demand for
engines at Rolls-Royce dropped from 1000 to 600 engines.
Figure 3: Worldwide Revenue Passenger KM (RPK) 2000-2004
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The U.S. space segment, both military and non-military, had sales of $20.6 billion in
2003. The satellite manufacturing industry had revenues of $14.9 billion and the rocket
manufacturing and launch operations generated $5.7 billion. The orders from governments,
universities and the military generated 83% of satellite manufacturing revenues, which drove the
rest of the industry.
20 From JP Morgan Aerospace and Defense report, September 2004
21 Interview with Richard B. Lewis II, formerly COO of Rolls Royce, April 2004
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3.2.2 Revenues in the Industry
The revenues have been discouraging for the overall industry. In recent years, the U.S.
aerospace & defense sector has seen revenue growth that has been below GDP growth. In 1988,
aerospace sales as percent of GDP were 2.2%. This figure climbed to 2.3% in years 1991 and
1992 but then started to decline steadily until recently settling at 1.5% in year 2002.2 Also, a
study of the division of revenues of the top 50 global defense companies shows that the portion
of revenues derived from military-related sales make from low of 2.3% to a high of 100% of
total sales. Hence, many companies in the industry are exposed to the commercial as well as
the military segment in significant amounts. The research and development efforts in the
industry have almost always originated in the military segment and then migrated to the
commercial segment. Chapter 4 as well as Chapter 5 will further explore this phenomenon.
3.2.3 Profitability of the Industry
The recent profit picture has been disappointing for the overall industry with all segments
experiencing significant declines in 2003, as shown in Figure 4 . The large commercial aircraft
segment had an average operating margin of 7.5% between 2000 and 2003 with a 2003 margin
of 5.9%. The same period saw the business and regional jet segment's average operating
margins at 12%. The jet engines sub-segment had a 13.4% average operating margin and the
rocket launch & satellite making segment had a negative 0.7% average margin over the same
period of time.
22 Aviation Industry Association Report 1988-2002
23 From S&P Aerospace and Defense Industry Report October 2004, compiled from Company Reports
24 Ibid
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Figure 4: Aerospace industry segment's profit margins




2O 2001 2002 20o AVERAGE
Large comrnercial aircraft 7.9 7.8 8.5 5.9 7.5
Business & regional aircraft 14.8 7.9 13.3 12.0 12.0
Maintenance, repair & overhaul 14.6 12.0 5.4 5.9 9.7
Jet engines 14.8 14.2 12.8 11.8 13.4
Military weapons 9.1 B.4 8.6 7.4 9.1
Rocket launch & satellite making 0.5 0.3 2.2 (5.9) (0.7)
Source: Company reports.
3.2.4 Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) market
The after-market maintenance and the engine overhaul supply chains are similar to new
products manufacturing supply chains, but different in terms of their financial impact. They are
highly profitable business for manufacturers in all tiers of the supply chain. The global MRO
market had revenues of $36 billion in 2003 and the global engine market had revenues in excess
of $31 billion. Most of the MRO activities are performed in vertically integrated organizations
such as national and large scale airlines that operate their own MRO facilities. Aircraft and
engine manufacturers also have MRO facilities that service airlines globally. The primary
service providers' revenues and in MRO activities is shown in Figure 526, which show Rolls-
Royce as the fourth largest player.
25 S&P Aerospace and Defense Industry Report October 2004, p. 6
26 From S&P Aerospace and Defense Industry Report October 2004, compiled from Aerostrategy
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Figure 5: MRO market share for engine overhauls for various service providers
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Tier 1 suppliers are further supplied by a large base of tier 2 and tier 3 suppliers, which
serve multiple industries (such as industrial manufacturing or automotive). These tier 2 and 3
suppliers supply all tier 1 suppliers, which share this common supply base, as is shown in Figure
627. The tier 2 suppliers include companies such as L-3Communications, Harris or Parker-
Hannifin. These are followed by tier 3 suppliers which include suppliers of machined
components such as castings and raw materials suppliers for metals and rubber. Except for the
first level of the supply chain who do not trade among themselves (aircraft manufacturers such as
Boeing and Airbus), companies actively buy from and sell to each other. Hence, for example,
Honeywell and Rolls-Royce are competitors and might collaborate and trade between themselves
too. Therefore, the industry is symbolized by collaborative programs and equity cross holdings
between aircraft manufacturers (Boeing and Airbus) and its tier I suppliers. At tier 2, 3 and 4
levels, there is a large and diversified manufacturing base which is shared by the consuming
supply chain tier above it.
Figure 6: Supply Chain Structure in the Aerospace Industry
Prime Tier-1 Tier-2 Tier-3
Contractor Supplier Supplier Supplier
Sales/ Sales/ Sales/ Sales/
Order Entry Order Entry Order Entry Order Entry
Purchasing - - - Purchasing - Purchasing - -- Purchasing - -
Manufac- Manufac- Manufac- Manufac-
turing turing turing turing
Flows: - -> Order/releases
--- Materials & parts
-> Internal requisistions/orders
27 Presentation by John F. Eash, The Boeing Company, from the LAI document repository
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3.4 Supply Chain Challenges and Opportunities
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the biggest challenge facing the industry is a maturing
market, slowing growth and industry consolidation. Since growth is slowing and each level of
the supply chain is consolidating, it puts pressure on each layer to become efficient and cost
effective to survive and gain market share from its rivals. This defines the opportunity for
operational improvements at each layer of the supply chain because the survival of each
company depends on whether it can deliver a better quality product at a lower cost, and on time
to its customer base.
3.5 Engines Segment of the Industry
The "engine" segment of the industry can be broken down into three categories: turbofan,
turboprop and turboshaftP . The turbofan segment constitutes the lion's share of the total engine
demand. Turbofans are used in most of the commercial and military aircraft. Turboprops are
used mostly in business and regional aviation as well as in the military (single engine trainers
and military transport). Turboshafts are primarily used in helicopters and some vertical takeoff/
landing aircraft. The main manufacturers of aircraft engines are General Electric Aircraft
Engines (GEAE), Rolls-Royce, Honeywell (Allied Signals) and Pratt & Whitney (P&W),
Snecma, Turbomeca and Williams. These players have remained in their leading positions since
past few decades and are expected to remain so in 2014.
28 Franus, David; Aviation Week & Space Technology Jan 17, 2005 pp. 117.
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Figure 7: Orders and deliveries for commercial aircrafts (1965-2001): A cyclical business
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Engine manufacturing is a cyclical business, which derives its demand from the delivery
orders for aircrafts (Figure 729). The forecast for selected manufacturers is shown in Figure 830.
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29 From S&P Aerospace and Defense Industry Report October 2004, compiled from Speednews
30 From Morgan Stanley Research Report on Rolls-Royce, December 2004, compiled from Company Data
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Its overall demand pattern has been as follows3 1 : Starting in 1995 with about 6750
engines, production rose to a peak of 7750 in 2001, before declining again to 6750 in 2004. The
production is forecasted to rise to 9500 in next few years, followed by a slump in 2011.
Customers would require fewer additions each year until the old inventory becomes old and
needs replacement. During 2005-14 a total of 56,000 turbofan engines worth $175 billion are
forecast for production (led by GEAE, P&W, Rolls-Royce and Snecma). The number of
turboprop engines in the same period is 9500, worth $8.3 billion (led by Pratt & Whitney and
Rolls-Royce). The number of turboshaft engines forecasted is 21,500 (led by GEAE), worth
$11.1 billion.
All segments- light business and regional jets, single aisle and widebody heavy jet
transport, military light and heavy jets are expected to grow during the 2005-2014 period.
Factors affecting business and jet transport engines is the introduction of new aircraft like A-3 80,
as well as continued growth in developing world (new planes) and developed world (replacement
of fleet). The factor affecting the military turbine engine production is the replacement of old
aircraft with newer generation fighters like F/A-22, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and Rafale. The
light attack aircraft and jet trainers find new markets in European, Middle Eastern and Asian
nations, and the demand is expected to double in from 2005 (125 engines) to 2013 (240 engines).
Similarly, the segments for turboprop engines are also expected to grow. Although the
turbofan use has diminished the market for turboprop engines, the civil applications in business
and regional are remaining profitable niches. In the military, turboprops have remained in
demand for single engine trainers and multi-engine transports. Multi-engine transports like
Boeing C-130 and Airbus A400M give a big boost to the production requirements for
turboprops.
3 Franus, David; Aviation Week & Space Technology Jan 17, 2005 pp. 117.
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For the turboshaft segment, the biggest customer remains to be the U.S. Army, with demand for
combat and cargo/ transport helicopters. The demand comes from reengining of existing fleet
and new military programs like rotorcraft aircraft ( Bell/ Boeing V-22), and the future Improved
Turbine Engine program (ITEP), which would be used for Army's need for a high-elevation and
the next generation medium lift transport helicopter.
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4 Rolls-Royce's Businesses and its Position
in the Aerospace Industry
This chapter considers Rolls-Royce's business divisions in terms of revenue and profitability.
That is the basis for continuing to explore how Rolls-Royce's aerospace business divisions fit
within the aerospace industry as a whole.
4.1 Rolls-Royce's Revenues and Profitability
Rolls-Royce Group Plc. is the second largest aircraft-engines company in the world, behind
General Electric Aircraft Engines (GEAE), with annual revenues of $10.1 billion and employs
36,100 people, 20,400 in aerospace in 48 different countries32. Its corporate headquarters are in
Derby, UK, while North American office is in Indianapolis, IN.
The company focuses on four markets i.e. Civil Aerospace, Military Aerospace, Marine
engines and Energy. The average return on capital employed for the group was 11.6%3, which
was higher than 2002 (10.5%), but the cyclical civil aerospace market has been declining since
2001. The group revenues over time and share of revenues by division are described in Table 2 3:
Table 2: Rolls-Royce group revenues by business segments 1999-2003
2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
Group Revenue ($ millions) 10,161 10,418 11,390 10,555 8,341
Civil Aerospace 48% 47% 54% 54% 55%
Military Aerospace 25% 24% 22% 24% 25%
Marine 16% 17% 13% 13% 8%
Energy 10% 11% 10% 8% 10%
32 Engine strategy pajs offfor Rolls-Royce, The Engineer, London: Feb 20, 2004. p. P.20
" Aviation Week and Space Technology, Jan 2004
3 From Rolls-Royce Annual Report 2004
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4.1.1 Profitability of the Business Units
The profitability (EBIT) of each division is shown in Table 3 3:
Table 3: Rolls-Royce group profitability by business segments 2002-2003
2003 2002
Revenue Profitability Revenue Profitability
Group 10,161 6.7% 10,418 6.5%
Civil Aerospace 4,849 4.9% 4,930 5.5%
Military Aerospace 2,516 10.5% 2,477 13.3%
Marine 1,669 7.7% 1,771 8.3%
Energy ___ 1,051 5.1% 1,150 -6.4%
As is obvious from the table above, Military and Marine business have the highest profit
margins, while largest segment i.e. civil aerospace has the most margin pressures. These
profitability measures paint a weak picture against GEAE, the leader in the aerospace market
with EBIT margins of 17% in civil segment and 23% in military segment 6. This could be
because GEAE has a 70% share of its civil aerospace revenues coming from aftermarket services
(with 30% profit margins), as opposed to 50% for Rolls-Royce. In military segment, GEAE has a
larger base of military aircraft and hence they can utilize their R&D and asset base more
profitably.
Besides the products, Aftermarket service revenues constitute 50% of revenues in each
division, and hence Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) contracts are strategic focus for
revenue and profit growth. This revenue is directly proportional to the number of engines in the
service and their age. Engines which are 5-9 years old provide the most aftermarket service
revenues, as can be seen in Figure 937.
3 From Rolls-Royce Annual Report 2004
36 Morgan Stanley Research on Rolls-Royce, Dec 2004
37 From Morgan Stanley Research Report on Rolls-Royce, December 2004, compiled from Company data and
Morgan Stanley Research
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Figure 9: Rolls-Royce fleet age composition 2003-10 estimates
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In 2003, these aftermarket services yielded $5.1 billion in sales (excluding joint ventures),
out of a group sales of $ 10.1 billion. Including joint ventures, the services revenue was $6.1
billion. On average, each unit sale of a gas turbine yields aftermarket services and product sales
amounting to twice the price of the original unit, and hence Rolls-Royce sees its installed base as
a source of stable and guaranteed revenue 3 . Figure 10 39 shows the growth in service revenues.
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3 Interview with Richard B. Lewis 1I, formerly COO of Rolls-Royce, April 2004
3 From Rolls-Royce Annual Report 2004
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At the end of 2003, Rolls-Royce had 54,000 gas turbines installed, aggregating all three
markets. This has grown a 100% since 1993, when it had 27,000 units installed, showing the
recent growth and penetration of Rolls-Royce into its traditional markets.
It serves its four markets with the same core technology i.e. 5-80 MW gas turbines
technology that can be used as a powerplant in a civil or military aircraft, ship or energy system.
In our focus on the aerospace industry, we would study Rolls-Royce's core product segment, i.e.
aircraft engines in this paper. But since the underlying technology is the same in all products, the
learning can be applied to other divisions as well.
4.1.2 Geographical Distribution of Revenues
Rolls-Royce increasingly sells in global markets, as shown in Figure 11. In 1993, its UK
sales were $1.7 billion, while in 2003, they were $1.81 billion40. Its non-UK sales grew from
$4.5 billion in 1993 to $8.4 billion in 2003. Its manufacturing facilities for aircraft manufacturing
are concentrated in US and Western Europe, while Marine manufacturing is dispersed in Eastern
Europe and East Asia as well.
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4.2 Rolls-Royce's Business Strategy
Rolls-Royce defines its strategy as follows4:
" Address four global markets.
" Invest in technology, capability and infrastructure.
" Develop a competitive portfolio of products and services.
" Grow market share and installed base.
* Capture substantial aftermarket service opportunities.
The priorities as defined by the Rolls-Royce group are4:
Focused investment in technology. Rolls-Royce sees its market for new products slowing
down, and its technology acquisition, as well as supporting new product development, would
increasingly focus on the development of derivative products, unit cost reduction, improvement
of in-service operation and extending the scope of value services.
Operational Excellence: Over time, Rolls-Royce has focused on getting more productive by
constantly focusing on its supply chain restructuring, improvement of manufacturing processes,
lead-time reduction and rationalization of facilities. Improvement initiatives have been launched
to focus upon operating and product unit costs.
Development of afiermarket services: Rolls-Royce offers long term service contract called
TotalCare in the civil sector and Mission Ready Management Solutions (MRMS) in the military
sector. These contracts, besides providing Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) facilities,
also offer engine health monitoring and predictive maintenance.
41 Rolls-Royce Annual Report 2004
42 John Rose, CEO, address to the shareholders in 2004 Annual Report
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4.3 Business Units
The company has four business units i.e Civil Aerospace, Military Aerospace, Marine
engines and Energy.
4.3.1 Civil Aerospace
Rolls-Royce has established itself as the number two civil aero engine manufacturer in the
world (after GEAE) with a 30% market share over past 3 years (in terms of number of engines in
service) 43. It is a world leader in the widebody aircraft category, with a world leading 50%
market share. It offers engines with a wide power spectrum from 2,000 lb thrust to 100,000 lb
thrust. It has an installed engine base of 10,450 at the end of 2003, and continues to grow. The
engine deliveries in this segment tripled from mid 1990's to 2001, followed by a severe recession
after 2001. Rolls-Royce expects the engine deliveries to gradually recover 2005 onwards. Its
strategy for this segment is to drive down costs, while increasing aftermarket service revenues.
Table 444 provides a picture of the division's recent history:
Table 4: Rolls-Royce Civil Aerospace division performance history 1999-2003
2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
Revenue in $ millions 4,849 4,930 6,197 5,670 4,579
Engine deliveries 746 856 1,362 1,091 1,080
Employees 19,800 21,100 23,900 24,600 25,700
Installed engine base 10,450 9,910 9,212 8,322 7,447
As is obvious from the table above, the new engine deliveries are slowing down, and hence
Rolls-Royce is focusing on aftermarket services, which form 53% of sales in this segment. In
that context, the installed engine base is a very important metric, and is tracked in the Figure
4 From Rolls-Royce Annual Report 2004
4 Ibid
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124. Rolls-Royce expects $28.5 billion of future revenues over next 25 years from this installed
base of 10,450 engines. These services' coverage has increased from covering 20% engines in
1993 to over 60% in 2003.
Figure 12: Rolls-Royce's installed civil jet engine fleet
E l I I e un[Its
Source: Public data provided by Rolls- Royce
Products and Customers: Over 30 civil aircraft types are powered by Rolls-Royce engines.
Most airlines fly aircrafts powered by Rolls-Royce engines, such as Boeing 747 (RB21 1) and
Airbus A320 (V2500). It offers Trent 500 on Airbus A340-500, and Trent 900 is offered on
Airbus A380. Among the regional and business jets, it offers successful products such as BR700
series (used in aircrafts like Boeing 717) and AE3007, used in regional jets like Embraer.
4.3.2 Military Aerospace
Rolls-Royce is number one manufacturer of military engines in Europe (in terms of
engines in service) and number two in the world (after GEAE), with 24,000 engines currently in
service46 In addition, the defense aerospace has also delivered 11,000 commercial helicopter
engines, and is the world's largest helicopter engine manufacturer. Its strategy in this sector is to
4 From Rolls-Royce Annual Report 2004
46 Ibid
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get certified on new military programs, improve efficiency and cost reduction and expand
aftermarket services. Table 547 presents the divisions history over past years:
Table 5: Rolls-Royce Military Aerospace division performance history 1999-2003
20)03 2002 2001 2000 1999
Revenue in $ millions 2,516 2,477 2,520 2,525 2,048
Engine deliveries 510 505 472 555 511
Employees 4,900 5,100 6,700 7,200 7,900
In 2003, aftermarket services represent 56% of sales, new engine deliveries represent 28% of
sales and R&D services to government accounts for 16% of sales. In a trend similar to civil
sector, the driver of revenues is the aftermarket services.
Products and Customers. Rolls-Royce offers a broad portfolio of product programmes in key
market sectors i.e. light attack aircraft, transport, trainers, light helicopters and surveillance.
Figure 13 displays the current engines, and their product life till the year 2020.4
US Department of Defense (DoD) is the largest government customers, and Rolls-Royce
supplies 25% of all engines purchase by the DoD. Rolls-Royce participates in the Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF) program with F136 and F136 turbofan engines. It also participates in V-22 Osprey
program, and has been successfully tested with production beginning in 2008. Further, Rolls-
Royce has a strong position in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) such as the US Global Hawk
and Firescout program.
4 From Rolls-Royce Annual Report 2004
4 Ibid
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Figure 13: Stages of lifecycle of Rolls-Royce's various military engines
Engine programme life
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Source: Rolls-Royce Annual report 2004
In Europe, the TP400 turboprop engine is certified on Airbus A400M transport plane, and
RTM 322 and MTR 390 turboshaft engines are selected for helicopters by Spain and Greece. In
Asia, Rolls-Royce sees demand for its Adour engine in Hawk jet trainers purchased by India and
UK.
Rolls-Royce's customers are increasingly focusing on purchasing capability rather than just
equipment, which translates into service revenues through MRMS contracts, and "Power by the
Hour" contracts. Its MRMS revenues have been $500 million since it was launched two years
ago.
4.3.3 Marine
Rolls-Royce is a world leader in Marine propulsion systems49 . It acquired Vickers plc to
achieve this position in 1999. It sells gas turbines in the 3-40 MW range, and the products such
49
49 Rolls-Royce Annual Report 2004
--
as MT30 (most powerful marine engine in the world, used by UK and US navy) have 80%
commonality with Trent 800 aircraft engine. Other smaller engines like NT5 and AG 9140/50
are derived from industrial gas turbine designs. Its strategy for this segment is to leverage its
civil aerospace engines to offer large marine gas turbines, and establish product leadership. It is
also focusing on operational efficiencies and increasing the aftermarket services.
The divisions' revenues and employees have varied over the years (Table 6)50:
Table 6: Rolls-Royce Marine Aerospace division performance history 1999-2003
2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
Revenue in $ millions 1,669 1,771 1,489 1,352 693
Employees 6,400 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,700
It has manufacturing bases in N. America, UK and Scandinavia, and low cost bases in
Poland, Korea and China. The revenue is balanced between naval and commercial sales (32.5%
each), with the rest 35% coming from aftermarket services. Rolls-Royce' equipment is operated
on 15,000 commercial vessels, 800 offshore support vessels and 2,000 warships.
Products and Customers: The commercial markets are offshore oil and gas, fast passenger
ships, cargo and liquefied gas carriers. The military customers are world's navies, primarily US,
Japanese and European navies. Rolls-Royce is the design authority for UK's nuclear submarine
fleet.
4.3.4 Energy
Rolls-Royce is the worldwide leader in its oil and gas applications, both onshore and
offshore. It uses this position to offer power generation solutions. The business uses gas turbine
50 From Rolls-Royce Annual Report 2004
51 Ibid
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technology at its heart, and leverages the industrial version of aero-engine cores, such as the
industrial Trent. It also utilizes cross-selling opportunities with the marine business.
While the current oil and gas market is strong, worldwide power generation business is
depressed. Rolls-Royce expects that gas turbine technology would be preferred by customers
when the market recovers, and has developed the industrial Trent based platform to compete in
this market. The strategy for this segment is to maintain its leadership position in oil and gas,
build a strong power generation business, grow the aftermarket service revenues and improve
manufacturing costs. Rolls-Royce intends to leverage its common technology for serving
multiple markets. The division's recent history is shown in Table 752:
Table 7: Rolls-Royce Energy Aerospace division performance history 1999-2003
2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
Revenue in $ millions 1,051 1,150 1,094 857 868
Engine deliveries 54 68 72 79 77
Employees 4,000 4,500 4,900 5,400 9,200
Products and Customers: The global energy demand is expected to double in size by the year
202053 . The primary growth is expected to come from developing countries, with Rolls-Royce's
most significant projects being in Qatar (Dolphin Energy Ltd.) and China (West-East China Gas
Pipeline). Rolls-Royce would use its RB211 gas turbine in both the projects, and the industrial
Trent powered gas compressors for underwater pipeline between Qatar and UAE. It also intends
to sell innovative aftermarket services to increase the revenues in this segment.
The next chapter would dive deeply into Rolls-Royce's commercial and military
aerospace segments, and explore the business practices within these divisions.
5 From Rolls-Royce Annual Report 2004
5 US Department of Energy.
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5 Rolls-Royce's Position as Aircraft Engines
Manufacturer and its Supply Chain
This chapter describes the overall position of Rolls-Royce in the aircraft engine
manufacturing industry and in its specific product segments. It details the structure of the
company's supply chain within the aerospace-related divisions, location of facilities and the
performance metrics that the supply chain is designed to focuses on. It uses this structure to
explore the supplier facing business processes, internal business processes, and customer facing
business processes of the supply chain.
Finally, the chapter studies the application of the business processes through key supply
chain initiatives at the company, and details a case study where the supply chain of a product was
improved using these key initiatives.
5.1 Market Share in Aircraft Engines
Rolls-Royce's market share can be seen from two perspectives i.e. by unit volumes and by
revenues.
5.1.1 Market share by engine unit volumes
Rolls-Royce is the second largest aircraft-engine manufacturer in the world, behind
General Electric Aircraft Engines (GEAE). Its competitive position over time for Single Aisle
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(SA) aircraft engines, Wide Body (WB) aircraft engines and regional/ corporate jet engines
against other primary manufacturers is shown in Figure 14.54
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Rolls-Royce has come back strongly in late 1990's to regain market share, and is expected to
retain it in near future. Table 85 describes estimates for market shares in the industry.
Table 8: Rolls-Royce's market share in engines (units) 2000-2010 estimates
2030 201 2012 203 2004EI 2005E 2006E 2007E 2008E 2009E 2C1(
Total Enghnes 2.294 2,480 2,040 I924 2.873 2.892 3,222 3,534 3.775 3,786 3 )i98
Single-Aisle 1,161 1200 '42 83G 886 984 0{1 186 ;.248 1.188 1. 1
Widebodv 488 512 438 412 384 4i8 46-4 511 592 5t2 536
Regional 646 768 66C 682 748 578 716 738 ( 68 702
Corporate 0 0 C 0 355 812 942 1, 2 1.251 1.4- 1, 3 ,
RR Market SharE
Single-Aisie 11% 12% 11% 9% 10 9% 19% 9% 10% 10 10%
Widebodv 23% 25% 25% 38% 41% 41% 40% 43% 45% 44%
Regional 5g% 55% 46% 33% 36% 34% 23% 24% 21% 19% 1
Cororate 36% 38% 35% 31% 32% 33% 34%
Total RR Market Share 28% 28% 24% 24% 25% 25% 26%











5.1.2 Market share by revenues
Its revenue share in the worldwide market for aircraft engines is expected to grow
stronger in its core widebody market, while it is expected to lose market share in small regional
and business jet market, primarily to GEAE and P&W 5 6. The overall market share, however, is
expected to grow in the future, and it is expected to retain its number two position in the
industry, as shown in Figure 15. The share in specific aircraft segments is given in Table 957.
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Table 9: Rolls-Royce share of engine revenues 2004-2010 estimates
Rolls-Royce Share of Engine Revenues 2004-10
RR Revenue Share 1%) 2004 200 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Widebody 39 39 36 44 45 43 44
Sinigle A&e 10 9 9 9 10 10 10
Regiona1 32 30 20 20 17 16 16
Source Morgn anvo Research is,1iaxs.
The reason for loss of market share in the regional aircraft segment is that in this
segment, only one manufacturer is typically certified on an aircraftX. Hence loss of market share
is proportional to loss of end-products' market share in this segment. GEAE and P&W are
certified on more popular models, and hence they would gain market share over Rolls-Royce.
5.2 Rolls-Royce's products and their competitive positions in aircraft engines market
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the gas turbine engine market has three sub segments i.e.
turbofan, turboprop and turboshaft engines. Rolls-Royce's position in each of these product
segments is as follows:
5.2.1 Turbofan engines
The demand for turbofans comes from following segments59. We discuss Rolls-Royce's
position in each of these sub-segments:
Heavy transportjets: This market is served by engines having thrust of 50,000 lb. of higher.
The market is expected to have growth driven by new large aircraft such as Boeing 7E7 (uses
GEAE GenX and Rolls-Royce Trent 1000) and Airbus A380 (uses GEAE-P&W GP7000 and
Rolls-Royce Trent 900). Production rates for Boeing jets such as 777, 747, A340-500/600 and
58 Interview with Henrique Marcondes from Embraer, March 2004
59Franus, David; Aviation Week & Space Technology, Jan 17 2005, pp 117
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A321 provides gradual growth and Rolls-Royce is among the top three producers, along with
GEAE and P&W.
Heavy militaryjets: The top three engine producers in this segment are P&W, GEAE and
Snecma, in that order. Major demand comes from new aircraft programs like F/A-22, F-35 Joint
Strike Fighter (JSF) and Rafale, which primarily use the three manufacturers mentioned above.
The largest demand (estimated to be in thousands of engine sales) would come from the US JSF
program where P&W and GEAE are the biggest competitors. In terms of volumes, Russia's
Saturn and Klimov are larger than Snecma, but are smaller in revenue terms. Rolls-Royce is not
among the larger players, and manufactures engines for the British Sea Harrier and Chinese
Phantom and J-7 fighters.
Light militaryjets: The chief producers in this segment are Rolls-Royce and Russia's
Klimov. This segment is small, with expected volumes of 125 engines in 2005, with demand
coming from small European nations as well as Middle Eastern and Asian air forces.
Light regionaljets: This segment is served by turbofan engines of up to 5000 lb. thrust. Rolls-
Royce addresses this market with turboprop engines, and not with turbofan engines.
5.2.2 Turboprop engines
The turboprop market has been losing market to turbofan engines, and the primary
application for turboprops is in the corporate and regional aviation market6o. There are
applications in the military segment too, as would be discussed below. The primary market
segments for turboprop engines, and Rolls-Royce's position within them, are as follows:
Civil aircraft: The primary manufacturers in this segment is P&W (with the PT6A engine),
which is projected to dominate the demand among the 6,100 turboprop engines (worth $3.3.
billion) that would be manufactured for civil applications over the next decade. The primary
60 Franus, David; Aviation Week & Space Technology, Jan 17 2005, pp 117
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demand driver in this market is single-engine business or regional aircraft. Rolls-Royce
competes in this market with the AE 3007 series which finds use in the Embraer ERJ 135, ERJ
140 and ERJ 145.
Military aircraft: The military turboprop market is also small (3,400 engines, worth $5
billion) and relies on a small number of turboprop powered models. Rolls-Royce is a prominent
player in this market with the AE 2100 engine, which powers the four engine Lockheed Martin
C-130J. The other prominent player is P&W with the PW 100 series, which powers the EADS
CASA C-295. The single engine trainer market, where P&W dominates, is declining, and hence
would affect P&W position in the market. Among the large programs on the horizon, the Airbus
A400M program has not certified Rolls-Royce for production.
5.2.3 Turboshaft engines
These engines are primarily used in helicopters.6'
Civil helicopters: P&W and Turbomeca are the leading players in this market. Civil
applications are small compared to military applications for turboshaft engines.
Military helicopters: GEAE is the largest manufacturer in this segment (selling T700 to
US Army). The 1200-2500 shaft horse power (shp) range constitutes 50% of the total turboshaft
engine demand, and GEAE fulfills 50% of the 1200-2500 shp demand. Rolls-Royce is active
supplying smaller engines like Model 250, which generate < 1000 shp, to British and French air
forces (Bell and Augusta Westland helicopters).
The primary demand for turboshaft engines comes from new engines for existing
helicopters, and new programs such as the Bell/ Boeing V-22 Osprey military rotorcrafts. The
new programs that would drive the future demand are in the 2500-3000 shp range, being
61 Franus, David; Aviation Week & Space Technology, Jan 17 2005, pp 117
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designed for US Army requirements for high altitude and 2-3 engine medium-lift transport
helicopters. Rolls-Royce is not yet competing in that segment.
5.3 Supply Chain Structure at Rolls-Royce
Rolls-Royce procures 70% of the components used in its final products, and only
manufactures 30% of the most value added components62. It operates manufacturing facilities
across the globe, and follows a strategy where each purchasing and manufacturing business unit
services all four business segments.
Rolls-Royce has a tiered supply chain, as described in Figure 6, which delivers structured
build packages for the engines. The focus in the company is on reducing the number of suppliers,
and Rolls-Royce in 2003 had 765 suppliers, down from 900 in 2002. On the other hand, they are
adding suppliers in emerging low cost countries, and have added 37 new suppliers in those
geographies in 2003. Over the years, the focus on cost reduction and increased collaboration with
suppliers has led to significant dependence on suppliers for success of cost reduction efforts
finished in such components as sub-assemblies. In 2003, Rolls-Royce reduced its costs by 5%.
Different manufacturing facilities are at different levels of progress on this front. For
example, The Indianapolis facility has reduced the supplier base from 1300 suppliers in 1999 to
300 suppliers 63 in 2004. However, it is still in early stages of establishing a tiered supply chain,
and has not achieved it completely 64.
Rolls-Royce has learnt from and taught best practices to its supplier base 65. Aerospace
industry shares a common supplier base for all engine manufacturers. Hence, the suppliers are in
62 Rolls-Royce Annual Report 2004
63 Interview with John McLauchlin, formerly Field Quality Engineer, Rolls-Royce, April 2004
" Ibid
65 Interview with Richard B. Lewis II, formerly COO, Rolls-Royce, April 2004
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good position to learn best practices of one customer, and initiate such practices in their
customers. Rolls-Royce shares its suppliers with successful companies such as GEAE, and has
used this captive knowledge from suppliers to establish certain best practices related to supplier
management.
Supplier collaboration has made Rolls-Royce responsible for maintaining/ supplying
spares and aftermarket services for parts that are not manufactured by itself. Hence, the focus on
cost reduction, quality and performance has shifted from Rolls-Royce's manufacturing to include
the entire supply chain. In this exercise, suppliers are teachers as well as learners.
Another focus area for the company is supply chain flexibility, which requires Rolls-
Royce to be able to scale its production up or down, as required by market conditions. Rolls-
Royce has negotiated flexible terms with its workforce to achieve such flexibility. Having such
negotiated terms is considered a competitive advantage within the industry, as is discussed in
Chapter 6.
5.4 Manufacturing Facilities and Suppliers
Rolls-Royce has a strategy where they use each manufacturing facility to service all four
business units66. However, some facilities are primary producers in each category. The primary
facilities for aircraft engines manufacturing are listed below, grouped by the customer segments
67they service
Civil Aerospace: The primary facility is in Derby, UK, which makes engines that serve the
airlines. It manufacturers the RB2l1 family of engines, which are used in Boeing 747/ 757
aircrafts. It also makes the Tay and heavier Trent family of engines, used in Fokker, Airbus
66 Interview with Richard B. Lewis II, formerly COO, Rolls-Royce, April 2004
67 Aviation Week & Space Technology, Jan 17 2005, pp 312
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A330/ A340, A380 and Boeing 777 aircraft. The regional and corporate aircraft are
manufactured in Dahlewitz, Germany and Indianapolis, IN, USA. This includes the AE 3007
engines for commercial aerospace and those with their partnership with Williams International.
Defense Aerospace: The primary facilities are in Filton, Bristol, UK and Indianapolis, IN. All
turbofan and turboshaft engines meant for military applications are manufactured here, though
the production at Filton facility is primarily turbofan engines, while in Indianapolis they
primarily manufacture non-turbofan engines. Many of the joint venture engines with Snecma,
Turbomeca, MTU, Honeywell and Viper are also made in these two facilities.
Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO): The MRO, engineering and support activities
for the military and commercial customers are done at Derby and East Kilbride in UK. Each of
Rolls-Royce divisions derives about 50% of their revenues through service contracts, and hence
this facility is a very strategic for Rolls-Royce' revenue growth and profitability.
Rolls-Royce outsources extensively to its key global suppliers68 such as Alcoa (airfoils), BF
Goodrich (measurement sensors), L-3 Communications (engine test beds), Northstar Aerospace
(gear boxes), Sumitomo (heat management systems for fuel and oil), Kawasaki Heavy Industries
(key engine parts), JJ Churchill (turbine blades), Whittaker Controls (fluid controls), Accuron
(ceramics), Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (gas turbine components), Intertek Caleb Brett
(metallurgical analysis), Texas Composite (guide vanes), Hispano-Suiza (power transmission
components) and Fern Engineering (joints/ coupling sections for energy systems).
5.5 Performance Metrics for Supply Chain
The key metrics used by Rolls-Royce to measure its supply chain performance are69:
* Quality of the delivered product
68 Information compiled from news releases and articles from the Lexis-Nexis Academic database and the Aviation
Week and Space Technology database.
69 Interview with Richard B. Lewis II, formerly COO, Rolls-Royce, April 2004
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" On-time delivery
" First pass test yields
" Past due receivables
" Cost of manufacturing and Return on Invested Capital
The single most important metric used by the engine manufacturing industry is quality of the
product, followed by on-time-delivery to the end customer. In a cyclical market for aircraft
deliveries, any time lost in an industry up-cycle is directly proportional to lost revenues. Hence
customers are extremely sensitive to delayed deliveries. Further, without a strict control of
quality in a highly regulated market, the company would not be able to satisfy other metrics such
as on-time delivery and cost controls if the product required re-work and repeated testing.
5.6 Supply Chain Business Processes
The supply side, inside and customer side business process in the company's supply chain
are described below. These are followed by description of the 40-day engine supply chain
initiatives at Rolls-Royce which demonstrates the application of the business processes.
5.6.1 Supplier facing business processes
The supplier facing business processes studied are:
" Supplier selection and segmentation
" Collaborative product development
" Procurement
" Supplier Management and Development
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Supplier selection and segmentation: Rolls-Royce uses a global base of suppliers and it
shares this supply base with its competition. Since the aerospace industry has few large suppliers,
Rolls-Royce uses all the large suppliers in the industry with no dedicated suppliers. It has a
varied supply base, and (for example) its purchases from its supply base in the US ranges from
$1 million for smaller suppliers to $40 million from the larger ones (for Indianapolis facility)70
As mentioned before, the supplier base has been drastically reduced, and the exercise is expected
to continue. For example in the US, the goal of the exercise is to reduce the supply base to 30 tier
1 suppliers from the current base of 300 suppliers. These suppliers would create sub-assemblies
from tier 2 and tier 3 suppliers, and supply 30 sub-assemblies to Rolls-Royce, who would then
assemble them to create an engine. The rationale behind the exercise is that Rolls-Royce has a
higher cost of labor than its suppliers and hence outsourcing would result in lowering the overall
cost of the final engine.
Collaborative Product Development: The company uses its primary suppliers to jointly
finance and co-develop new products. Such suppliers are called Risk and Revenue Sharing
Partners (RRSP's)7 1 . Under the partnership, the suppliers invest capital in development of a new
engine, as well as provide product development engineers. This reduces Rolls-Royce's
investment in the project, and also reduces the critical development time (typically 3-4 years),
since more resources are now being used to develop an engine. Therefore, the payback period for
investment is also lesser than a typical period of 10 years.
Rolls-Royce writes revenue sharing contracts with the RRSP's, giving them more
responsibility as business partners. The structure of the contracts and its comparison to earlier
practices is as follows: Earlier, build-to-specification subcontractors used to recover non-
70 Interview with John McLauchlin, formerly Field Quality Engineer, Rolls-Royce, April 2004
71 lbid
63
recurring costs up-front as they delivered the components, but now RRSP's prorate their
investments in items such as tooling and testing equipment over an agreed number of aircraft. If
the sales goal is exceeded, the partner recoups his costs, and earns additional profit. Else, he
absorbs a portion of fixed, non-recurring costs. Similar terms exist in R&D investments.
The cash flows from such a project are far less cyclical, and hence the capital at risk is also
low for Rolls-Royce. Typical cash flows (cumulative) from such a project in commercial
aerospace are shown in Figure 1672 (Total Care stands for cash flows from aftermarket services
in the commercial segment):
Figure 16: Impact of RRSP's and Total Care on Rolls-Royce's Cash Flow
Cumulative Cash Flow
Traditional - - - RRSP funded - RRSP & Tota! Care
Year
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These practices are becoming more common with new engines development, or for redesigning
of old engines, and not for existing engines.
Procurement: Rolls-Royce distinguishes between items supplied by its suppliers and
classifies them as A, B or C class item. Any item less than $100 of cost is considered a C-class
item. In North America, Rolls-Royce has outsourced the handling of C-class items (5000 items)
72 From Morgan Stanley Research Report on Rolls-Royce, December 2004, compiled from Company data and
Morgan Stanley Research
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to Wesco, a company based in California, USA. The agreement with this company is to establish
a 2-bin Kanban, and quantity bands for control measures. Wesco is responsible for product
availability and it does so using UPS as a logistics provider. For procurement of these parts,
Wesco is authorized to negotiate the procurement, stocking and delivery of these parts and deals
directly with Rolls-Royce's chosen suppliers to do so.
For procurement, Rolls-Royce is a pioneer in the use of paperless procurement by using the
industry portal called Exostar. It was a founding member of Exostar and uses it extensively to
communicate the demand and supply information with all of its 700+ suppliers. This has
replaced earlier processes which were manual and paper based to a new process which is
automatic, real-time and provides visibility to all suppliers who can track the status of purchase
orders and receipts in the supply chain. The demand for all suppliers is communicated through
Exostar, which is updated once each week. The payments are also electronic and the system uses
SAP data which is well integrated with Exostar and enables the suppliers to see the data in Rolls-
Royce systems in the format that they would want. The total value of Rolls-Royce's buy is $1
billion.
Supplier Management and Development: Rolls-Royce has established a Supplier Council
which meets for 3 days twice each year- once in US and once in Europe. The goal of the council
is to forge management level relationships and invite and share suggestions for supply chain
improvements. This council is a core part of Rolls-Royce's strategy to reduce its costs and
complexity in the supply chain and improve its efficiency. It uses these meetings to create
functional working groups consisting of engineers from Rolls-Royce as well as suppliers, who
then share ideas and practices related to these functions between themselves.
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It also provides its suppliers with its own engineers who study the supplier's processes and
their effect on Rolls-Royce's supply chain. It visualizes the bottlenecks of its suppliers as a
bottleneck in its supply chain, and hence invests in developing the supplier's ability to deliver on
time, at lowest cost and highest quality. The purpose of the exercise is to improve suppliers'
processes, and mitigate the risk that their operations might put on Rolls-Royce's ability to
deliver. This exercise is a data driven exercise using tools such as root-cause analysis, and results
in score-cards being given to suppliers to track their progress on improvement initiatives.
The suppliers are encouraged to develop complementary capabilities by sharing knowledge
and transferring technology. They are then certified for process capability and are delegated
more responsibility such as managing the Tier-2 suppliers. These practices insure that lean
manufacturing practices trickle down all through to lowest levels of the supply chain.
5.6.2 Internal business processes
Product portfolio management: A key factor of success in the aircraft engine manufacturing
industry is to get certified on new aircraft programs and maintain an active portfolio of
products. Therefore, Rolls-Royce is continuously working on new products. These engines are
developed in two ways 1) engines derived from existing models and platforms and 2) totally new
engines.
The company finds it cheaper and faster to develop engines from existing platforms74 . It also
uses engines developed from military programs such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (where
R&D is financed by the government) as platforms from which commercial engines are
developed. Using this strategy, the company has been able to act on its declared principle of
73 Interview with John Weiss, i2 Technologies, VP Aerospace Practice, March 2004
74 Interview with Richard B. Lewis II, formerly COO, Rolls-Royce, April 2004
66
using its existing technology to produce engines for new aircraft programs. This also reduces the
supplier certification and testing process and hence reduces the development time of the engine.
As a result, very few completely new engines were required to be developed in recent years.
Product development is another focus area where the company has set a goal to be able to be
develop derived engines in 24 months- and the new Trent 1000 engine to be used for Airbus
A380 has been developed in 24 months.
Facility and Capacity planning: The facility and capacity planning at the company is done in
accordance to the industry cycles. The company pursues to have the key capability to increase
and reduce its capacity and hence fixed overheads as demand rises and falls. This is done
through negotiated labor contracts that allow reduction in capacity, and also following JIT
principles with its suppliers.
Planning Systems and Technology: The industry and the company do not seem to use much of
Advanced Planning Systems and software 76. That is perhaps because the industry is not a high
unit volume industry which might face particularly taxing scheduling or distribution issues. The
products are highly engineered and the focus is on supplier collaboration software, which
integrates company and supplier's operations. Further, in a highly regulated environment, the
ability to use conventional methods for optimizing is limited, which limits the use of APS
software. Rather, the potential for optimization lies in synchronizing material deliveries and
availability from suppliers. Overall, the industry looks at IT as an enabler, rather than a strategic
tool, and IT outsourcing is a growing trend 77.
75 lbid
76 Interview with John Weiss, VP, i2 Technologies, March 2004
77 Interview with Pete Wiese, CSC, Practice Manager, Aerospace, Defense and Industrials Group, March 2004
67
Rolls-Royce has linked its business processes and synchronized its IT/ IS infrastructure to
allow seamless information flow between itself and its suppliers 8 . This allows for use of 'pull
signals', two-way information exchange and visibility. An example of innovative use of IT is use
of web cameras where the suppliers can see the product being built to get visual signals of when
supplies might be required. Therefore, when an engine is pulled by the customer off the test bed,
it sends a pull signal not only through Rolls-Royce supply chain, but all through the supplier
network, reaching component level and raw material suppliers. This ensures flexibility and rapid
response capability in the supply chain.
Inventory Management: For the purposes of inventory management, most components are
maintained on a just-in-time (JIT) basis. However, certain components, such as castings and
finished metals, as well as certain raw material inputs, have a lead time of up to 120 days. Other
products, such as Fuel Controls, have greater than 30 day lead times, and the company stocks the
necessary components and raw materials. The second kind of product kept in inventory is MRO
parts.
Inventory Management for Aftermarket service parts: The inventory management for aftermarket
service parts is not a mature science, since failure of some parts like turbine blades are
predictable, while others are not. The majority of maintenance expenses are incurred after the
warranty runs out. Therefore, Rolls-Royce can use its historical engine usage data to its
advantage and assume the risk of maintenance of customers' fleets, which enables it to write
long term high margin aftermarket service contracts with airlines. This exercise is harder to do in
military segment since the military does not provide usage data as openly as the commercial
segment due to the related security concerns.
78 Video cassette from Rolls-Royce about its supply chain initiatives in 2000-04. The project described was the AE
3007 flow line, where lean operations principles to improve operational parameters.
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These parts are managed using advanced predictive software and tools which use engine
use-data collected over several years 9. These tools predictive failure rates for various parts and
Rolls-Royce uses such forecasts to decide stocking levels and strategic locations for MRO parts.
These aftermarket services are quite profitable (as mentioned in chapters earlier), and Rolls-
Royce competes with different companies for this business. A capable inventory management
technique for aftermarket services and parts is a key ability required to maintain market share in
a high margin service offering. For example, it competes with its own customer Lockheed Martin
in f providing such services in connection with the C-130 fleet owned and operated by the U.S.
Department of Defenseo. Boeing is planning to enter the aftermarket segment too as Airbus
started doing last year, to be able to offer a complete lifecycle support solution for the product to
the airlines"'. It also competes against smaller firms that service engines with non-authentic
parts. These parts reduce the maximum life of the engine, but are cheaper. Rolls-Royce uses its
knowledge about the engine to price its services higher, in return for a promise to extend the
maximum life of the engine.
The company does not hold any end-product inventory, since each engine is engineered
and made to order.
Production Management8 2 : The production management at the company is structured on lean
principles and the idea of having a flow-line for each product. To cite the example of
Indianapolis facility: until 1999, Rolls-Royce used to manufacture engines by keeping engines on
a stand. The parts would be brought to this specific location and the engine would be assembled.
Further, the assembling of the engine would not be started until all the parts had arrived- which
79 Video cassette from Rolls-Royce about its supply chain initiatives.
g0 Interview with Richard B. Lewis II, formerly COO, Rolls-Royce, April 2004
81 Interview with CIBC World Markets, April 2004
82 Interview with Richard B. Lewis II, formerly COO, Rolls-Royce, April 2004
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lengthened the manufacturing flow time of the engine. The parts were delivered to a location at
the plant site by all suppliers and Rolls-Royce moved them to the manufacturing location of the
engine. Furthermore, the stands on which the engines were manufactured acted as a bottleneck
and multiple engines could not be manufactured due to shortage of space.
This process has now changed dramatically, and Rolls-Royce now uses what is called a flow-
line concept. This concept was successfully applied to their AE 3007 engine in Indianapolis (as
described in the 40-day engine initiative later in the chapter). The differences are:
" Now, the engine moves on a flow line from location to location on the shop floor for 8
different manufacturing stages. Its manufacturing is started as soon as parts sufficient for
the first stage have arrived.
" The parts are now delivered by the supplier to the actual point of use on the engine flow
line. This reduces the total time a worker has to walk to get the parts. It also makes
suppliers responsible for the parts, which has increased the quality of the parts delivered.
" The tools and parts at each stage are now grouped in "kittings" (kitting is done either by
their suppliers or by Wesco for C-class items).
" The manufacturing at each stage is organized into cells with cross-trained workers who
could do multiple tasks in a cell. The workers were incentivised to create their own tool-
kits and layout of the cell, which increased worker productivity by 40%.
* They have also attempted to reduce lead times for manufacturing of parts such as turbine
blades, and the goal is that each manufactured part would also have its flow line. These
parts were earlier machined completely in-house. But now, Rolls-Royce purchases 'near-
net-shape' castings which are machined to specifications in-house- the lead time for this
process is now 2 days, and the yields are much higher.
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Rolls-Royce, therefore, has been able to implement the lean production approach using pull
signals to generate downstream demand, produce on a flow line, use kitting for procurement,
involve suppliers in design and development of products and also use JIT and Kanban for its
material planning. All these production methods were learned from best practices that had been
adopted earlier by the automobile industry. These lean practices were originally developed by
Toyota and are generally known as the Toyota Production System. This unique blend of best
practices that works well for Roll-Royce has been termed the Rolls-Royce Production System
(RRPS), and the suppliers are expected to learn and transform using it5 3 .
These production methods are designed to support the 40-day engine initiative, with 30
days for parts sourcing and parts manufacturing, and 10 days for assembly and testing.
Transportation and Warehousing: The company uses third party logistics (3PL) providers for
transportation and warehousing. Since it considers these activities as non-core activities, it
outsources them to providers such as UPS. Different 3PL providers are used in Europe and US.
5.6.3 Customer Facing business processes
The aerospace industry is an engineering-driven environment. Since the customers in the
industry are engineering companies buying highly advanced made-to-order engineering products,
the typical customer-facing supply chain processes (e.g., distribution and channel management,
customer segmentation and customer management, order quoting and order fulfillment) are not
generally practiced, in the traditional sense, within Rolls-Royce.
However, Rolls-Royce's customers are few and powerful due to the recent industry
consolidation. Hence, Rolls-Royce's focus is to retain customers, and acquire new ones by
providing them the best product quality, competitive cost and on-time delivery. It also has to
83 Interview with Richard B. Lewis II, formerly COO, Rolls-Royce, April 2004
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offer creative innovative aftermarket services to differentiate itself and maintain high margins. It
does so by offering differentiated prices to different customer segments, as noted below.
Differentiatedpricing to different customer segments : Rolls-Royce discounts the prices of the
engines to ensure aftermarket parts and service revenues (which are usually twice the revenue
from the sale of the engine and higher in margins). Therefore, Rolls-Royce distinguishes
between customers that buy smaller quantities and do not buy service contracts, and larger
customers, such as airlines, that buy large numbers of aircraft and award long term service
contracts. This practice is fairly prevalent in the industry. For example, GEAE financed the
Airbus A350 program to get exclusive aftermarket service contracts for its engines.
Further, Rolls-Royce also offers different pricing for aftermarket services to military and
commercial customers. Since military customers do not share usage data, it is hard to predict the
failure rates, and the risk of offering aftermarket service warranties is higher. Therefore, it prices
the aftermarket services for commercial customers (Total Care program) differently from the
"Power by the Hour" or Mission Ready Management Solutions (MRMS), even though the
engine would be the same. For example, Embraer aircrafts uses the same engine as installed on
V-22 aircraft used by the US Marine Core. However, Rolls-Royce prices its services at $50-60
for Embraer aircrafts and $150 for the V-22 aircrafts of the US Marine Core.
5.7 Supply chain initiatives: 40-day Engine
Rolls-Royce started several initiatives in 1998, when it became a member of the Lean
Aerospace Initiative at MIT8 5 . These initiatives are based on adoption of lean manufacturing
8 Ibid
8 Interview with Richard B. Lewis II, formerly COO, Rolls-Royce, April 2004
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principles in its operations and supply chain. The key supply chain excellence initiative at Rolls-
Royce is the 40-day Engine initiative.
The 40-day initiative is an umbrella initiative under which multiple supply chain
excellence programs would be started to address various operational issues at Rolls-Royce. The
initiative is planned to cut down a key supply chain metric i.e. manufacturing, assembly and
testing lead times for its engines to 40 days. Out of these 30 days would be for parts
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manufacturing and procurement (from suppliers), and 10 days for assembly and testing
Lead times are directly responsible for higher inventory and slow reaction to change in demand
picture. A cut in lead time would significantly reduce the working capital invested in the supply
chain, and hence the capital at risk which is exposed to uncertainty. The company has a goal of
producing all engines within this 40-day timeline by end of 200687. By March 2003, five engines
met the 40 Day Engine targets8 .
One of the engines being produced in 40 days is the AE 3007, which is used as a case
study below to understand this strategic supply chain practice at Rolls-Royce. The case study
shows the typical supply chain problems that Rolls-Royce faced, and the strategy, methodology
and steps it took to address these problems.
5.8 Case study of AE engine flow line at Indianapolis plant (Plant 5)
This case study describes a 4 year effort (2000-04) at Rolls-Royce Royce to streamline
the AE engine flow line under the 40 Day Engine program". This resulted in a total of $250M
worth of plant improvements by 2004.
86 Interview with Richard B. Lewis II, formerly COO, Rolls-Royce, April 2004
7 Ibid
" Rolls-Royce Annual Report 2004
89 Video cassette from Rolls-Royce about its supply chain initiatives in 2000-04. The project described was the AE
3007 flow line, where lean operations principles were applied and the project was used as a template for
improvements in other products.
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5.8.1 Background (2001):
The Indianapolis operation (founded in 1915 as Allison, acquired by Rolls-Royce in 1995)
produces three major product families (i.e., AE series, T56/501 series, and Model 250). The
facility produced 2 Engines/day, and utilized $1 M worth of spare parts /day. It had $1.5B in
annual sales in 2001. The facilities employed 4,400 People, including 1950 UAW members, and
had 3,000,000 sq. ft. of active floor space. It had 2,700 active machine tools and 7,000 active part
numbers.
5.8.2 Supply Chain problems
The symptoms that were indicators of supply chain problems at Plant 5 were:
" Inventory stockpiling: Sub-assemblies were being built all across the facility, and
therefore inventory was collecting in multiple locations. As a result, the employees were
spending 40% of their time in locating the required parts for production, or in acquiring
them from suppliers.
" Lack of any process flows: Different processes were done in different locations with no
relation to their position in the sequence of manufacturing operations for an engine.
" Delayed deliveries to airlines and other end customers.
" Manufacturing was regularly behind its manufacturing schedule, thus increasing the need
for costly material expediting.
5.8.3 Supply Chain improvement process under the 40 Day Engine initiative
The initiative includes implementing the following six steps in order to improve the velocity
and responsiveness of the supply chain:9 0
1. Simplify the gas turbine as a product, which would also simplify its manufacturing.
90 Video cassette from Rolls-Royce about its supply chain initiatives in 2000-04. The entire process described
through step 6 about the improvement steps is taken from the video cassette, unless specified otherwise.
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2. Synchronize the supply chain activities across the organization so that all departments
execute to a common plan.
3. Manage the supply chain at the correct level of detail (choosing what to manage).
4. Reduce variability in manufacturing and supply chain processes.
5. Implement 'pull signals' throughout the supply chain to manage materials in the product
flow line.
6. Optimize the entire value stream from suppliers to customers, so as to meet the common
supply chain goals i.e. what is needed, where it is needed and at what price is it needed.
These are elaborated as follows:
1) Simplify the gas turbine: The goal of this step is to simplify the design of the gas turbine,
which is expected to simplify the manufacturing of the turbine. This would be a major initiative,
since it would directly affect the number of parts, number of suppliers, supplier selection,
outsourcing decisions and Rolls-Royce' ability to service its customers.
The first exercise in this direction would be to ensure that the physical part and
information flow together, rather than separately. Hence, at any stage, the product should have a
sheet of paper with all the relevant information that would be needed for a given stage. This
succinct presentation of relevant information would reduce the time a worker/ engineer would
need to understand the requirements of the stage and take decisions if required.
The second exercise would focus on reducing the number of parts that were actively
maintained in Rolls-Royce's systems. For example, in its turboprop manufacturing operation in
Indianapolis, Rolls-Royce maintained 2,700 Active Machine Tools and 7,000 Active Part
Numbers in 2001 91. The focus is to reduce the number of parts, while increasing the number of
components that are ready to be integrated with the engine. This puts more responsibility in the
9' Information from Richard B. Lewis II, formerly COO, Rolls-Royce, April 2004
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hands of the suppliers, as well as makes Rolls-Royce depend on them for quality and after
market services to the customer.
The third exercise in this regard would be to reduce the lead times throughout the supply
chain. This would directly impact the amount of parts inventory required to maintain the
customer service levels, and the need for safety stocks.
2) Synchronizing the supply chain plan: Rolls-Royce has directed all departments of the
supply chain to work on a single plan. The departments are procurement, inbound logistics,
manufacturing, systems integration, product delivery, outbound logistics and after market
support. This reduces the variability in plans across the divisions, as well as potential conflicts of
interests. All departments now know what to expect, and hence inter-departmental collaboration
is faster and smoother. The performance parameter such as what is required, at what price,
frequency, quality and efficiency is dictated by two things: a) the model of engine b) the
customer of that engine.
Therefore, when these parameters are known and agreed upon by all departments, then
the entire supply chain works to deliver to the expectations, and looks at achieving the global
optimum, rather than local optima.
3) Managing the supply chain at the right level: A significant thought in supply chain
planning at Rolls-Royce is the idea of managing the chain at the right level. The idea is to avoid
managing supply chains at those levels where the value added or the value-at-risk is minimal.
Therefore, for example, they would not manage the suppliers of certain raw materials which are
not critical to Rolls-Royce's products. They would focus on the actual supply quantity and
quality, rather than pay attention to the actual supplier performance.
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On the other hand, they would collaborate with and invest heavily in a supplier that, for
example, provides the front end or back end assembly of an engine. That is because such
assembly is a highly engineered product that is unique to an engine design. Further, the Rolls-
Royce powerplant connects to the customers' systems though its front and back end. Hence,
these parts are critical to ensure that the Rolls-Royce powerplant integrates and performs well in
the customers overall aircraft, marine or energy systems.
4) Reduce variability in manufacturing and supply chain processes: Achieving consistency
in product and process quality is key to using lean principles successfully. If the product quality
is not consistent and requires frequent re-work, then any time and material saved by other lean
processes would be wasted. Similarly, if lead times or yields of a process are highly variable,
then it makes difficult to plan such a system, and hence optimize it.
Therefore, Rolls-Royce has established quality teams to increase the quality of its
suppliers, its own manufacturing processes and reduce the variability of lead times and
throughput times across the supply chain. These teams use principles of continuous improvement
and regularly meet in councils to share ideas and transfer best practices.
5) Implement pull systems in the engine flow line: Rolls-Royce has implemented lean
manufacturing principles in order to reduce material and time waste from the engine flow line.
An important principle of this methodology is the use of pull signals, which starts from finished
goods inventory to trickle down to raw material supplier. An engine is built only when a
customer pulls a finished engine. Till such time that all finished engines are allocated to
confirmed orders, a new engine is not built.
To enable tracking and visible signals about the status of production of an engine in its
flow line, Rolls-Royce is using information technology heavily. This includes real time
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information on parts, status at any stage of manufacturing and the related processes.
Additionally, Rolls-Royce uses webcams of the shop floor to provide visible indication to all
departments as well as suppliers and customers about where an engine is in its stage of
manufacturing at all times.
6) Optimize the entire value stream: Finally, the focus of Rolls-Royce supply chain strategy is
to focus not only on the internal processes, but also those that lie outside its walls but affect the
supply chain directly. Hence, Rolls-Royce manages some of the critical suppliers very closely.
The various aspects of the task are:
Choosing a supplier: Rolls-Royce's process for selecting its suppliers is dictated by its
supply chain goals. This includes the decisions such as where the supplier is located and its
capabilities, and is also guided by the location of the customer. If required, Rolls-Royce chooses
a supplier closer to the end customer for improving the customer service or reducing the lead
times.
Understanding supplier bottlenecks: The company actively participates in supply chain
management at its critical suppliers. A bottleneck at a supplier's end has the potential to disrupt
the entire value stream. Hence, Rolls-Royce tries to understand the quality, delivery
performance, responsiveness and reliability of the supply chains of its suppliers as well.
E-procurement: The company uses e-procurement (Exostar) to get visibility into delivery
quantities and delivery schedules. This also helps maintaining quality standards and expediting
processes such as invoicing and accounts payable.
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5.8.4 Steps in implementing a supply chain process improvement
Rolls-Royce executed the effort to increase the efficiency of the AE engine supply chain
in the following steps:
1) Create an organizational buy-in: The first step was to create an agreement about the
recognition of the problem, and about a need for change. This was done at all levels- from
employees to senior management responsible for the AE engine's manufacturing.
2) Communication: The next step was to accelerate the buy-in through presentation of factual
data that emphasized the problem. This data presented statistical, financial and customer service
metrics.
3) Establishing a vision: This was followed by communicating the solution to the problem i.e. to
create a smooth AE engine manufacturing flow line.
4) Confirm management's commitment for change, and create a competent team: The best
people available were staffed on the process improvement team. This confirmed management's
involvement in the process and was a sign of long term push towards the use of lean
manufacturing principles.
5) Measure success: Each milestone and success was measured and feedback loops were created
to study the results, thereby modulating the inputs in the improvement process.
5.8.5 Results
The following results in Table 1092 demonstrate the success of the exercise, and how it
affected operational metrics, supply chain flexibility and worker productivity. The metrics show
a year by year improvement as the implementation progressed.
92 Information from Richard B. Lewis II, formerly COO, Rolls-Royce, April 2004
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Table 10: Performance metrics 1999-03 for
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
ROIC Index 17 40 90 67 153
Customer Satisfaction 57 64 71 72 74
Index
On-Time Delivery Index 6 18 49 84 84
Cost of Non-Quality Index 291 218 171 172 144
Inventory Turn Index -- 44 62 60 58
Cycle Time Index 652 436 326 273 200
Employee Turnover Index 100 106 107 109 101
Hourly Skill Index 24 30 38 41 59
Salaried Skill Index 6 23 31 48 66
Training Index 89 81 81 71 110
1) Improvement in performance metrics:
The assembly and testing cycle time for an AE 3007 engine was reduced from 13.8 days
in 2000 to 11.5 days in 2001 and to 6.5 days in 2002. The quality, delivery performance and
customer satisfaction improved while inventory fell significantly. Rolls-Royce shared the
resulting financial benefits among managers and workers, creating a sense of responsibility and
ownership among workers, thus setting in place incentives for a virtuous cycle of continuous
improvement.
2) More flexible supply chain
The supply chain is more flexible due to use of cell layout for manufacturing, and the use
of pull signals. The changes inspired by lean manufacturing were as follows:
80
40-day engine implementation (AE engine)
1) The factory layout was changed, and the entire assembly operation was located to a new site
within the same plant. The manufacturing changed to cell layout with cross trained teams in each
cell.
2) Parts were located close to their point of use, and the suppliers delivered the parts directly to
these locations. For each stage of manufacturing, a kit was created with all the required parts.
This reduced lead time, total distance traveled for workers, variation in manufacturing times of
each step and improved the quality and reliability of each manufacturing operation.
3) Tool management was introduced as a practiced, requiring each tool to have a 'home' and be
accounted for at the end of each shift.
4) The union was consulted and agreed to a flexible workforce, which is critical to having a
responsive as well as profitable supply chain.
3) Improvement in worker productivity
Workers were allowed to design their own flow line and their tool kits. This allowed the
company to utilize the knowledge of the workers, and improved employee productivity by 40%.
Focus shifted from individual performance to team performance, as success was measured by the
end product i.e. a high quality and on time delivery, rather than individually. Hence team
dynamics improved, leading to further productivity gains.
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6 Role of Rolls-Royce's Supply Chain in its
Business Strategy
This chapter explores Rolls-Royce's business strategy, and the important competencies
that make a supplier competitive in the current aerospace landscape. This framework is used to
explore how Rolls-Royce's supply chain operating model contributes to strengthen its strategic
positioning and business strategy as a tier I supplier in this industry. Four strategy models (i.e.
those proposed by Simchi-Levi9 3, Fisher94 , Hammer95 and Porter9 6 ), which study the relationship
between supply chain design and its role in the company's business strategy, are used to analyze
the role of Rolls-Royce's supply chain operating model in its business strategy.
6.1 Rolls-Royce's Business Strategy
Rolls-Royce pursues parity in operational excellence with its competitors. It believes
that in a mature industry with stable and large competitors such as GEAE and P&W, it does not
have a strategic technological or financial competitive advantage. Therefore, the long positions
in the industry would be that of parity, rather than any one firm having sustained strategic
advantage. However, its supply chain is an integral part of its business strategy and helps
maintain a strategic parity with the competitors. This role is studied in this chapter in perspective
of the models referenced in Chapter 2.
93 D. Simchi-Levi, P. Kaminsky, E. Simch-Levi, Designing and Managing the Supply Chain, Mc-Graw Hill, NY
2000. pp 121
9 M. Fisher, What is the Right Supply Chainfor Your Product?, Harvard Business Review, March-April 1997
9 M. Hammer, Deep Change, Harvard Business Review, April 2004
96 M. E. Porter, What is Strategy?, Harvard Business Review, November-December 1996
97 Interview with Richard B. Lewis II, formerly COO, Rolls-Royce, April 2004
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6.2 Role of Supply Chain Operating Model in Rolls-Royce's Business Strategy
Rolls-Royce operates with an engineer-to-order business model, and its supply chain is
geared to support that product manufacturing and delivery structure. Using Simchi-Levi's
model9 8 of push versus pull based strategy99 , Rolls-Royce uses a pull-based strategy since it
operates in an uncertain demand environment in its orders products, and they each engine
produced is one of a kind, with no mass production of a the specific designs. The strategic
positioning of its operating model is shown in Figure 17. This strategy ensures minimal
investment of capital and reduces the capital at risk in raw material and work-in-process
inventory, which is also assisted through the use of JIT principles as well as through a reduction
in need by shortening manufacturing lead times.
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Further, delivery time is an important factor for success in the industry. To evaluate the
supply chain on this front, we can apply Fisher's model 0 ' for designing the right supply chain
for a given product. Since Rolls-Royce's products have an unpredictable demand, yet require a
high degree of customization, Rolls-Royce has a 'responsive' supply chain focusing on delivery
times. This design ensures that the company retains its customers and hence its market position.
Responding to a customer deadline is critical to get repeat business, and the sale of each new
engine leads to twice as much revenue in aftermarket services. Also, quality issues or late
deliveries can affect future contracts with its customer base, which are few in number with each
customer making large purchases. Hence a customer oriented, responsive supply chain supports
the key success factors for the company and its long term positioning.
6.3 Key Operational Objectives, and their Role in Strategy and Operating Model
Rolls-Royce's key metrics for operational performance are Quality, Cost and Delivery. In
a mature and consolidating industry, it seeks to retain customers, as well as do so profitably.
Therefore, the operational objectives for a supplier are customer response oriented (quality and
on-time delivery), as well as efficiency oriented (product costs and labor productivity). Given the
fact that the aerospace suppliers compete on these parameters, the operating model is designed to
continuously drive forward to excel at these operational objectives.
As discussed above, performance on delivery times is essential to success of the firm. In
case of a pervasive tendency of a given supplier to miss delivery dates, a manufacturer must
either find a secondary source (which often may not exist due to highly engineered nature of
products), or delay production. In such a scenario, the aircraft manufacturers might risk present
and future contracts with airlines or they may run into serious schedule delays and cost overruns
"0 M. Fisher, What is the Right Supply Chain for Your Product?, Harvard Business Review, March-April 1997
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on military acquisition programs. Airlines report that inability to take delivery of an aircraft in a
timely manner can result in significant foregone profits'02 .
Rolls-Royce's primary supply chain initiatives 40-day Engine (discussed in Chapter 5) is
a key exercise that focuses on quality, cost and delivery. It has the following six objectives:
" Simplify the gas turbine as a product, which would also simplify its manufacturing,
impacting quality, cost as well as ability to deliver on time.
" Synchronize the supply chain activities across the organization so that all departments
execute to a common plan.
* Manage the supply chain at the correct level of detail (choosing what to manage).
* Reduce variability in manufacturing and supply chain processes.
" Implement 'pull signals' throughout the supply chain to manage materials in the product
flow line.
" Optimize the entire value stream from suppliers to customers, so as to meet the common
supply chain goals i.e. what is needed, where it is needed and at what price is it needed.
These steps strongly impact the quality, cost and delivery measures. Other initiatives such as
the Rolls-Royce Production System are also designed specifically to improve these parameters.
Using Hammer's model'0 3 to understand the metrics that are important to Rolls-Royce, the role
of the supply chain in delivering to these metrics, and to therefore understand the role of these
objectives on its strategy, it is clear that the company's operational excellence efforts maximize
the activities related to quality, costs and delivery. As a result, Rolls-Royce has been able to
maintain as strong a supply chain as any in the industry, and has been able to compete and gain
market share by strengthening its capabilities to perform well on these measures.
102 US International Trade Commission, Competitive Assessment of US Large Civil Aircraft Aerostructures Industry,
June 2001
103 M. Hammer, Deep Change, Harvard Business Review, April 2004
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6.4 Other Operational Objectives that Determine Competitiveness
The aerospace suppliers function in a highly regulated environment, and compete for
business from only a few buyers'0 . Since this industry has few large manufacturers which buy
and sell from each other, there is no clear owner of market power. Further, though quality is an
important factor for choosing a supplier, the ability to produce quality products is a primary
factor, yet not the only determinant of competitiveness.
The determinants of competitiveness for a supplier to aerostructure manufacturers depend on
the tier of supplier. As the aerostructure manufacturers shift more and more responsibility to tier-
1 suppliers such as Rolls-Royce, generally higher the tier, the more important is the supplier's
ability to share risk. This requires a sufficiently large financial base and a high level of technical
expertise.
The other key factors that affect competitiveness can be divided into cost based and non-cost
based factors, as analyzed by a USITC study'0 5 , and are discussed below in detail. The cost
factors that can affect price include production efficiency, labor, capital and economies of scale
and learning effects. The primary non-cost factors include technological capabilities, on-time
delivery and flexible production capacity. Finally exchange rates can also affect the
competitiveness of a supplier.
6.4.1 Cost Factors
The following cost factors are determinants of a supplier's competitive strengthens:
1) Production efficiency: The manufacturers expect suppliers to have the ability to reduce cost
of their products continuously using innovative manufacturing techniques, which reduces the




total cost of a new aircraft program. The ability of a supplier to achieve productivity and
efficiency step increases is a function of their technological and financial resources.
Rolls-Royce's 40-day engine program is designed to decrease the inventories throughout
the supply chain, and increase worker productivity, thereby improving production efficiencies.
This increases the Return on Assets of the company, and uses information technology to co-
ordinate and collaborate with suppliers, and develop them (through the Supplier Councils) using
continuous improvement philosophies. This program, therefore, adds significantly to the
company's strategic ability to compete in the market.
2) Labor flexibility: Low labor costs and ability to expand or contract the labor force in
accordance to production levels is a key element of having the flexibility to react to a cyclical
market while minimizing costs. The labor cost share of total costs depends on complexity of the
structure and the equipment being used. The companies focus on labor flexibility because a lack
of restrictive labor laws and contracts is considered a competitive advantage.
Rolls-Royce has a policy to outsource 70% of its manufacturing. That ensures that it only
keeps the highest value added operations in-house. This enables it to achieve highest returns
from its expensive labor force, while outsourcing low value manufacturing to suppliers that have
lower labor costs106 to reduce its workforce. The company has been able to reduce employee
base from 43,300 in 2001 to 36,100 by end of 2003, while increasing revenues per worker from
$203,000 in 1999 to $280,000 by end of 2003107. It has also been negotiating with its unions to
allow the flexibility to react to demand changes. Therefore, Rolls-Royce is making its supply
chain lean and flexible to compete well on this key parameter.
106 Interview with John McLauchlin, formerly Field Quality Engineer, Rolls-Royce, April 2004
107 Rolls-Royce Annual Report, 2004
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3) Capital: Aerospace industry is a highly capital intensive industry, and is unique in that sense
from most other manufacturing sectors. Participation in large aircraft programs requires large
investments. Therefore, the ability to raise capital for investment is a competitive advantage.
Capital may be used for several purposes, such as acquiring new tooling, managing supply chain,
R&D, training, and developing new manufacturing capabilities. It is also required to enter
increasingly prevalent risk sharing programs. Therefore, access to financing and having a high
credit rating is important, as well as having a supportive government can help a company get
subsidies/ cheap loans and offer a lower bottom line prices to customers.
Rolls-Royce, with $10.1 billion revenues and a proven ability to manage supply chains,
improve its technology and manufacturing practices so as to contribute strongly to development
of new products, is well positioned in the industry.
4) Economies of Scale and Learning affects: Reduction in direct costs and fixed costs over the
long term is a goal which the manufacturers seek, and they want their suppliers to spread costs
over large production runs. The ability to do so is dependent on access to raw materials, skill
levels of workers and efficiency of equipment. It is also a function of overall corporate structure.
Furthermore, large production runs lend opportunities for learning and continuous process
improvement. Working with a manufacturer over a long period of time allows the supplier to
learn about what might be of major importance to that manufacturing customer. Such learning
also leads to developing a competitive advantage when bidding on new projects. Once such
procedures are learned, they can yield important benefits over recurring projects.
Rolls-Royce has demonstrated its ability to reduce costs over long production runs by
improving revenue per employee and the ability to use similar product platforms to serve a
variety of markets, which enable it to use its supply chain infrastructure to increase the
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production runs and further reduce costs. It has also been able to compete well for new programs
such as the Airbus A380, Boeing 787 and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter based on its existing
learning about customer needs and requirements.
6.4.2 Non-Cost Factors
The non-cost factors are core competencies of the company; ability to deliver on time and
have flexible manufacturing capabilities, and whether the supplier is specialized or diversified.
1) Core competencies: The ability of a supplier to meet the technological needs, meet design
responsibilities and to maintain an efficient supply network are critical to its success as a
supplier. Increasingly, most aerostructure manufacturers prefer dealing with fewer, capable
suppliers who can not only handle their own networks but those of tier-2 and tier-3 suppliers.
Rolls-Royce supply network based initiatives (discussed later) lend strength to its
competitive position in the industry.
2) Flexible manufacturing capacity: Also, a flexible production capacity is important since
airlines often change or cancel orders due to market fluctuations, which requires a supplier to
quickly react to the situation as well as remain profitable.
3) Specialization and Diversification: A challenge for a supplier in this industry is whether to
specialize in certain types of components, which is viewed favorably by aircraft manufacturers,
or to diversify into related businesses such as aircraft MRO or supplying to non-aircraft
manufacturers. Specialization increases the risk of having a bigger impact in low demand
periods, while diversification spreads the risk, but at the cost of losing reputation for being the
'expert' from aircraft manufacturers' perspective. Being able to balance the two planks also
lends advantage to a supplier.
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6.5 Business Practices that Strengthen Rolls-Royce's Competitive Position
The role of business practices that impact the strategy, operating model and operational
objectives as can be understood by studying the key business initiatives and practices (Section
5.6 and 5.7) at Rolls-Royce, and how they impact its operational objectives as discussed above in
Section 6.3 and 6.4. Using Porter's model108 to understand the unique set of activities that create
a competitive advantage for Rolls-Royce, we study the role of business practices in fulfilling key
operational objectives.
6.5.1 Supplier Network Management
Rolls-Royce has among the best supplier management practices in the industry and it
considers itself a pioneer in the field'". These practices are described below", and its affect on
strategy and operational objectives is discussed.
Supplier involvement in product design and development: Rolls-Royce integrates key
strategic suppliers early in the product design and development phases to ensure that maximum
value is delivered throughout the product lifecycle. Strategic collaborations with suppliers are
managed by 'System Integrators' at Rolls-Royce (as described in 6.5.3), who are at a high level
of management hierarchy. Collaboration is executed at all levels of organization from Program
Managers to Engineering. This results in a collaborative design and architectural innovation that
reduces design lead times.
Its ability to collaborate with its RRSP's also enables it get access to vital capital and reduce
its own exposure to market risk, and reduce the invested capital-at-risk. This ability is crucial for
a tier 1 supplier, as it helps aircraft manufacturers (customers of Rolls-Royce) to reduce the
1O' M. E. Porter, What is Strategy?, Harvard Business Review, November-December 1996
109 Interview with Richard B. Lewis II, formerly COO, Rolls-Royce, April 2004
110 Information from interviews with Rolls-Royce and related research at Lean Aerospace Initiative at MIT, April
2004
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overall cost of new programs. This activity fits well with activities that require capital to build
economies of scale to lower cost, as well as building core competence in new technologies.
Continuous improvement in supplier base: Rolls-Royce establishes joint-targets (such as 7%
annual cost reduction goals), and then institutes rewards when the goals are met. These rewards
include benefit sharing schemes which focuses of creating win-win situations and further
incentives to improve. They also ensure that lean principles are continuously being practices and
improved upon by using metrics to drive network-wide performance, including its own.
This practice further drives collaboration and sharing of risk with RRSP, and makes more
capital available for investment in its suppliers in a virtuous cycle of further integration with
suppliers.
Investments in supplier's capabilities: Rolls-Royce has found that gains from investments in
supplier's capabilities can outweigh the costs of building in-house capabilities such as flexible
tooling, enhanced support functions and workforce re-training over the long term. Lean practices
have had slower penetration to lower level suppliers, since unexpected changes in delivery dates
or quantities affect them more severely, and can be prohibitively expensive with lean
manufacturing. But as new programs are launched, with Rolls-Royce investing in suppliers,
more and more suppliers start using lean manufacturing principles since the benefits accrue over
the life of the program.
These practices further drive production efficiencies (as described in 6.5.2) and fit well with
other business practices to form a positive reinforcing loop that drives strength in these core
activities.
6.5.2 Production Management
Rolls-Royce's production improvement initiatives such as the 40-day engine and Rolls-
Royce Production System enable it to achieve production efficiency. Its supply chain enables
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the company to deliver quality product to its customers at the cheapest cost and rapidly adjust to
dynamic market situations. It also enables it to use same product platforms to serve multiple
markets, thereby creating scale and spreading the costs over long production runs. Together with
its outsourcing and supplier network development capabilities (described in 6.5.1 and 6.5.3), it
reduces labor overheads and increase its flexibility to react to a cyclical market demand. This
further drives its market penetration and thus builds economies of scale, which further lower the
cost structure and increase quality and delivery standards. Therefore a virtuous cycle involving
outsourcing and collaboration with suppliers is created which drives production efficiency and
vice-versa.
The company and its suppliers use their scale to invest heavily in maintaining
technological leadership and product innovation, which can be reaped with high market share
and over long time horizons. This then helps the supply chain to build core-competence, as
described by Porter' and creates an integrated set of activities (together with 6.5.1) that provide
strategic strengths, not only due to their fit with the business strategy and operational objectives,
but also due to their fit with each other.
6.5.3 Management Structure
Rolls-Royce's corporate structure uses 'System Integrators' to collaborate at high level with
the suppliers and share knowledge and best practices in production and operations management
with them. This enables it to have a technologically capable supplier base that can contribute
significantly to a new program. Thus, this activity combines the strength of supplier
management (6.5.1) with its own strengths in production management (6.5.2) to affect Rolls-
Royce's ability to launch new programs cheaply, quickly and yet do so with high quality
products due to competence of its suppliers and its own operational excellence. This activity,
.. M. E. Porter, What is Strategy?, Harvard Business Review, November-December 1996
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therefore directly impacts the operational objectives of quality, cost and delivery and strengthens
Rolls-Royce's competitive positioning.
Thus, working together, the company's supplier management activities such as the Supplier
Council, its production management activities such as the 40-day engine and Rolls-Royce
Production System, and its management structure which uses 'System Integrators' to multiply its
capabilities with those of its suppliers creates a powerful synergy which lends strength to Rolls-
Royce's business strategy and competitive positioning.
To summarize, Rolls-Royce competes not just with its internal operational capabilities,
but also leverages a symbiotic management structure with the capability of its suppliers. It has
learned new principles, techniques and practices from its collaboration with MIT's Lean
Aerospace Initiative, from benchmarking against its competitors and other industries such as the
automobile industry, as well as its suppliers. It has used this knowledge to design business
practices that fit well with its business strategy, its supply chain operating model and key
operational objectives. These initiatives have had a positive impact on its enterprise-level
performance in the recent years, as well as on the performance of its supplier network. The result
of these improvements are on-going and are expected to continue in the future. Indeed, Rolls-
Royce has demonstrated its competitiveness by gaining market share in a mature industry since
the late 1990's by using a variety of operational techniques and innovative initiatives that have
made its supply chain excellent.
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